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ABSTRACT 
The Impacts of Privatization and Government Intervention 
in the Economy: An Empirical Analysis (Two Essays) 
by 
Tayseer Al-Sumadi, Doctor of Philosophy 
Utah State University, I998 
Major Professor: Dr. Basudeb Biswas 
Department: Economics 
iii 
In this dissertation, we provide empirical assessment of government 
involvement in economic activities. This assessment is done within the framework of a 
two-part strategy. In the first part, we evaluate the effects of the government size on 
the overall rate of economic growth of a group of 30 developing countries. This 
approach can be regarded as macroeconomic in the sense that the economywide 
growth is the subject of investigation. In the second part, we conduct a comparative 
study of technical efficiency between privately owned and publicly owned companies 
in the international oil industry. We refer to this approach as microeconomic since a 
particular industry is under investigation. 
This dissertation consists of two essays. In the first essay, we examine the effect 
of government size, measured by the ratio of government consumption expenditures to 
gross domestic product (GDP) on the rate of growth of GDP. Our sample includes 30 
IV 
low-income and middle-income developing countries over the period 1970-90. We use 
a panel data approach to avoid the shortcomings of the cross-country models often 
used in such an analysis. The results indicate government size has a highly significant 
negative influence on the rate of economic growth. Therefore, privatization is viewed 
as a structural adjustment policy to overcome the negative effects of government size. 
However, we emphasize this policy can be effective only in the proper environment in 
a market-oriented economy with well-established political, social, and economic 
institutions, and a well-defined property right system. The essay provides some 
empirical evidence from a group of countries about the impact of privatization on the 
rate of economic growth. 
In the second essay, we measure the firm-specific technical efficiency for a 
sample of 44 publicly owned and privately owned petroleum companies in the 
international oil industry. The empirical investigation is carried out by using the 
stochastic frontier production function approach. The results indicate the private 
decision-making units in the oil industry outperformed their publicly owned 
counterparts in terms of technical efficiency. The implication is privatization can 
improve the performance of the transformed public enterprises. 
(120 pages) 
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INTRODUCTION 
After World War II, the governments of developed and developing countries 
played a central role in economic activities of their countries. In the developed world, 
government intervention was necessary to rebuild the infrastructure destroyed during 
the war. In the developing countries, the governments assumed the central role in the 
economy to build and develop the poor infrastructure. Most of the developing 
countries were under colonial rule, which was unfavorable to local entrepreneurs and 
hence did not encourage private investment. The legacy of the colonial era, coupled 
with the example of the Soviet model, resulted in greater participation by the state in 
economic development. 
The government intervention in these countries went beyond the traditional 
role when the public sector created many public enterprises to be engaged in the 
industrial production in pursuing the import-substituting-industrialization policies. 
Moreover, the expansion of the public sector encouraged the rent-seeking activities at 
the expense of profit-seeking activities. 
The role of developing governments in economic activities was disappointing 
from macroeconomic and microeconomic perspectives. From the macroeconomic 
perspective, the growth of the government size over the last three decades created 
severe macroeconomic imbalances and made the developing economies vulnerable to 
the external shocks. In addition to the mounting external debt, these imbalances 
resulted in budget deficit, current account deficit, high rates of inflation, and high 
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unemployment. All these contributed to reducing the rates of economic growth in most 
of the developing countries. 
From the microeconomic perspective, on the other hand, the efficiency of the 
public enterprises was cast in doubt. This was attributed to many factors such as the 
attenuation of property rights, the principal-agent dilemma, the political intervention in 
the decision-making process, the ambiguous and overlapping goals and functions of 
the public enterprises, and the poor incentive systems in the public institutions. The 
inefficiency of the public enterprises was on the top in the list of arguments against the 
leading role of the public sector in the developing countries. 
To overcome their microeconomic and macroeconomic inefficiencies and 
imbalances, most developing countries underwent structural adjustment policies under 
the auspices of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. One of the major 
adjustment policies was privatization, which means, generally speaking, the 
transformation of economic activities from the public sector to the private one. This 
policy swept through developed and developing countries over the last three decades. 
Furthermore, it gained major momentum after the collapse of the command economies 
of the former Soviet Union and countries in East Europe. 
There is strong consensus among economists and politicians that privatization 
is the panacea for many economic imbalances and inefficiencies that plagued 
developing economies in the last few decades. From a macroeconomic point of view, 
downsizing the government means lower fiscal deficit, current account deficit, and 
external debt. Moreover, privatization creates more stable and well-established 
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macroeconomic policies and also leads to price and trade reforms which eliminate the 
economic distortions. 
From the microeconomic point of view, transferring the public sector units to 
the private sector leads to transferability of property rights and a more effective system 
to monitor the performance of these decision-making units. The decision-making 
process will be determined by the market forces rather than being decided by a group 
of bureaucrats who are removed from realities of production. Moreover, it is expected 
that the transferred units will have clear and well-defined goals and objectives. 
The aim of this dissertation is to investigate the economic effects of 
privatization from macroeconomic and miceroeconomic perspectives. This dissertation 
consists of two essays. In the first essay, the relationship between the government size 
and economic growth, as a measure of general economic performance, will be 
assessed. For this purpose, we use panel data set on a sample of 30 low-income and 
middle-income developing economies over the period 1970-90. Furthermore, this 
essay will shed light on the empirical evidence on the privatization effects in some 
countries that implemented this policy. Our research in this area departs from the vast 
majority of the received empirical studies in the following respects. First, we use the 
panel data approach to study the effects of government size on economic growth. 
Second, we provide empirical evidence concerning the impacts of privatization in 
some countries that implemented this policy. Finally, we use the most recent data 
provided by Heston and Summers (1995). 
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In the second essay, we provide an empirical assessment of privatization on 
economic efficiency, more specifically, technical efficiency. For this purpose, we 
estimate and compare the level of technical efficiency of 44 cross-country production 
units in the international oil industry. Of the 44 firms, 17 are publicly owned and 27 
are privately owned. The stochastic frontier production function will be employed as a 
method of estimation. The oil industry was chosen for two main reasons. First, oil is a 
strategic commodity in civil and military activities, which is why many countries 
believe that the operation of this industry should not be left to the private sector. 
Second, this industry produces an almost homogenous output, uses the same 
technology, and competes in the global market, which makes the comparison 
straightforward and reasonable. 
References 
Heston, A. and Summers, R. (1995) Pen World Tables 5.6, University of Toronto: 
http://datacenter.epas.utoronto.ca:5680/pwt/pwt.html. 
ESSAY I: THE EFFECT OF GOVERNMENT SIZE ON ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION 
ON A GROUP OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
USING A PANEL DATA APPROACH 
I. Abstract 
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This essay examines the effect of government size, measured by the ratio of 
government consumption expenditures to GDP on the rate of growth of per capita 
GDP. Our sample includes 30 low-income and middle-income developing countries 
over the period 1970-90. We use a panel data approach to avoid the shortcomings of 
the cross-country models often used in such an analysis. The results indicate 
government size has a highly significant negative influence on the rate of economic 
growth. Therefore, privatization is suggested as a structural adjustment policy to 
overcome the negative effects of government size. However, we emphasize this policy 
can be effective only in the proper environment in a market-based economy, well-
established political, social, and economic institutions, and a well-defined property 
right system. The essay provides some empirical evidence from a group of privatizing 
countries about the impact of privatization on different macroeconomic variables and 
on the rate of economic growth. 
2. Introduction 
The heated debate about the extent of the government role in economic 
activities is nothing new in the economic literature. In the sixteenth century, the 
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mercantilist school advocates "favored a strong central government to enforce the 
regulation of business" (Oser and Blanchfield, 1975, p. II). At that time, the 
government played a vital role in the economy and adopted different policies of 
intervention, which included granting monopoly privileges, imposing restrictions to 
limit competition, and providing subsidies to different economic sectors. 
The eighteenth century witnessed the rise of the classical school following the 
pioneering work of Adam Smith. The first and foremost principle of this school was 
laissez fair, which claims "[t]hat government is best which governs least" (Oser and 
Blanchfield, 1975, p. 44). The proponents of this tree-enterprise economic theory 
argued the market is the right mechanism for efficient allocation of resources. 
Therefore, the government role in economy should be limited to the provision of 
public goods and services the private sector cannot or does not desire to provide. 
These include national defense, maintenance of law and order, and basic 
infrastructures such as railroads, ports, and dams. 
The issue of government intervention took a new tum in the beginning of the 
nineteenth century after the emergence of Marxist socialism. This school took the 
opposite extreme of the classical school by introducing the idea of entrepreneurial 
government and favoring large-scale government intervention in the economy. The 
protagonists of this school argued the market efficiency is attained under a set of 
unrealistic conditions, such as perfect competition and perfect information, and in the 
absence of these conditions the market is doomed to fail , which creates a prima facie 
for government intervention. 
7 
After World War II , the governments of developed and developing countries 
played a vital role in economic activities. In the developed world, the birthplace of 
free-market theories, government intervention came about as a result of the 
infrastructure destruction in the aftermath of the war. In the developing countries, the 
governments assumed the central role in the economy to build and develop the poor 
infrastructure. Most of the developing countries were under colonial rule, which was 
unfavorable to local entrepreneurs and hence did not encourage private investment. 
The legacy of the colonial era, coupled with the example of the Soviet model, resulted 
in a greater participation by the state in economic development. 
Government intervention in these countries went beyond the traditional role 
when the public sector created many public enterprises engaged in industrial 
production in pursuing the import-substituting-industrialization policies. The 
expansion of the public sector encouraged rent-seeking activities at the expense of 
profit-seeking activities. 
The oil crisis in 1979 and the external debt crises in the 1980s pointed to 
harmful effects of government-led policies. Moreover, the poor performance of public 
enterprises in developing countries over the last three decades highlighted the negative 
role of the government in the functioning of the economy. Since then, it was proven 
that pervasive government intervention contributed negatively to the overall economic 
performance. 
In the last two decades, most developing countries underwent structural 
adjustment policies under the auspices of the World Bank and the International 
8 
Monetary Fund to solve various macroeconomic imbalances created by the pervasive 
public sector. One of the major adjustment policies was privatization, which swept 
through developing countries in the last three decades and gained much more 
momentum after the collapse of the command economies of the former Soviet Union 
and countries in East Europe. 
The retrenchment of the developmental state paradigm and the sweeping 
privatization triggered an overwhelming research attempting to investigate the effects 
of government size on economic and social welfare. In the absence of a clear-cut 
economic theory framework in this area, in addition to some other factors to be 
explained later, this research came with conflicting results. This essay aims to 
investigate the effect of government size on economic growth and to investigate 
whether privatization is the panacea for the economic problems plaguing developing 
countries. Our research departs from the vast majority of the received empirical 
literature in the following ways: First, we use a panel data approach to study the effect 
of government size, in lieu of a cross-country approach. Second, we provide 
overwhelming empirical evidence about the effect of privatization in the countries 
implementing this policy. Finally, we use the most recent data provided by Heston and 
Summers (1995). 
The rest of this essay is organized as follows: In the next section we provide a 
theoretical explanation of the secular growth of government size over time. Section 3 
contains a review of the empirical literature. Section 4 sheds light on the government 
role in the economies of some Asian countries, i.e., the East Asia11 Miracle. The 
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theoretical model is discussed in section 5. The data set and the empirical estimations 
are discussed in section 6. Privatization techniques and the effects of country 
characteristics on its implementation are introduced in section 7. The role of 
privatization, from theoretical and empirical perspectives, in solving the 
macroeconomic imbalances in developing countries is the subject of section 8. We end 
up with concluding remarks in section 9. 
3. The Growth of Government Size 
The secular growth of government spurred economists to investigate the 
reasons behind the growth of the government size. Consequently, many theories have 
been put forward to explain the growth of the public sector. These theories include a 
wide rage of explanations, including social, political, and economic factors . We 
provide a cursory review of some of widely prevalent theories in explaining the 
growth of government size: 
Wagner's Law 
One of the hypotheses aiming at explaining the secular growth of the 
government size is what is called Wagner's law, which was introduced by Adolph 
Wagner in late nineteenth century. 1 This hypothesis states that the income elasticity of 
demand for goods and services provided by the government is greater than unity. The 
size of government is expected to increase as the level of per capita GOP increases. 
1See the appendix for the microeconomic foundation of this hypothesis. 
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This hypothesis failed to specifY the stage of development in which this 
relationship is expected to occur. Moreover, it does not identify the pattern of change 
of particular components of government expenditures (Afxentiou, I 982). 
The empirical test of this hypothesis yielded mixed results. Easterly and 
Rebelo (1993) found some support for Wagner' s law while Joulfaian and Marlow 
(1991) confirmed this hypothesis in the U.S. economy. Lin (1994) found evidence that 
this hypothesis was true only in developed countries. Ram (I 987) found that while 
time-series models provide support for this hypothesis, the cross-sectional models do 
not. Ferris and West (1996), however, failed to confirm this hypothesis. 
Public Choice Hypotheses 
Some of the main functions of the government are to provide public goods and 
services as well as to eliminate, or at least mitigate, externalities. Based on this 
argument, some public choice hypotheses tend to explain the growth of the public 
sector. Median voter theorem and the interest group hypothesis are eminent among 
these hypotheses. The first one suggests the government opts to target certain groups 
of people (e.g., poor people, farmers, and urban population) who might possess 
noticeable voting power. To gain their votes, the government might introduce some 
distributional measures to improve the welfare of these groups at the expense of others 
who do not have the same voting power. This theorem is more applicable to the 
democratic countries where the elections are held on a regularly basis to determine 
who will govern the country. The local and national governments in these countries 
tend to increase their expenditures by providing more goods and services (e.g., police, 
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education, and transportation services) to satisfy the needs of the targeted people. This 
results in larger government with more public goods and services provided. 
The interest group hypothesis explains the growth of government through the 
existence of special interest groups who put pressures on the government to introduce 
some activities designed to reduce the transaction costs borne by these groups. These 
groups could include the government employees who might have discretionary power 
to achieve their own interests at the expense of the citizens (Mueller, 1987). When the 
new activities are introduced, it becomes difficult to reduce or eliminate them in the 
future, which leads to secular growth in the size of the government. The empirical 
evidence of Ferris and West (1996) provides some evidence in support of these 
hypotheses. 
Baumel's Effect 
The government sector is typically labor intensive since employment is one of 
the socioeconomic goals for any government. The growth of productivity is mostly 
embodied in the technological change. Baumel's effect or Baumel's cost disease 
argues that service sectors, which are highly labor intensive, lag other sectors of the 
economy in the productivity growth. 2 Because of that, the cost of providing public 
goods and services will increase more quickly than the cost of providing private goods 
and services. This causes the price of government goods and services to increase over 
time. 
2See the appendix for the microeconomic foundation of this hypothesis. 
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This hypothesis is based on the argument that the price elasticity of demand for 
goods and services provided by the public sector is less than unity. Mueller (1987) 
found that Baumel's effect explains 25% of the increase in government size for the 
average Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) country. 
Ferris and West (1996) reported empirical results which lend support to this 
hypothesis. 
Fiscal Illusion Hypothesis 
Fiscal illusion hypothesis assumes that the citizens measure the size of 
government by the size of their tax bill. If the tax burden can be disguised, then the 
citizens cannot measure the true size of government which can grow beyond the levels 
they tolerate (Mueller, 1987). Kneebone (1992) found support for the existence of 
fiscal illusion in the Canadian economy. Oates (1985) reported the following five 
sources of this illusion: 
Complexity of the tax structure. This means the more complex the government 
revenue system, the more difficult for the voters to estimate the actual tax-price they 
pay for public goods and services. 
Renter illusion. This occurs because the property tax is not paid by the tenants 
but by the owners, who tend to pass this tax to the renters in the form of high rents. 
This makes the tenants fail to link the government spending to their rent payments. 
Income elasticity of the rel'enue system. This suggests people do not care about 
their tax bill but about their tax rate. Therefore, in booming times when the income 
level increases, the government levies more revenues and its size grows. 
13 
Debt illusion. In this case it is assumed the citizens care if the government 
projects are financed through taxation, but they do not care if these projects are 
financed by government borrowing. Therefore, they fail to estimate the cost they bear 
as a result of this borrowing. This means reliance on borrowing rather than taxation to 
finance public projects results in larger government. 
The flypaper effect. This means that the government officials can use the lump-
sum intergovernmental grants to convince the voters that there is a decrease in tax 
rates needed to finance different government programs (Oates, 1985). Therefore, 
Oates (1985, pp. 23-24) defines the flypaper effect as the existence of "a significantly 
higher propensity for recipients to increase public expenditure in response to the lump-
sum intergovernmental grants than in response to equivalent increase in private 
income." 
Political Social and Economic Ideology 
As mentioned at the outset, many economic schools have arisen in the last few 
centuries. These schools have had different political and social as well as economic 
backgrounds and implications. Consequently, the size of the government varied 
substantially depending on the ideologies prevailing in the subject countries. 
Government size was noticeably large in the countries that imbued with the socilalist 
paradigm (e.g., former Soviet Union and East Europe). On the contrary, the 
government size in western countries, where the laissez faire dichotomy prevailed, 
was smaller with a large private sector taking the economic lead. 
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Displacement Effect 
The displacement effect hypothesis states the tax burden can increase when the 
taxpayers believe that the increase is justified. For example, during war, depressions, 
or other national crises, the government involvement is expected to increase, so "an 
otherwise intolerable tax burden may become acceptable" (Kneebone, 1992, p. 1297). 
However, because of the expanded bureaucracy and the concentration of power at the 
national level, the new situation, i.e., the higher tax burden, is expected to continue 
even after the crisis passed (Slemrod, 1995). 
4. Literature Review 
In the last two decades, ample research about the effect of government 
involvement in economic activities on economic growth has taken place. Given the 
difficulties in assessing the real scale of government involvement, different proxies for 
this variable were employed, including the size of government consumption 
expenditure, government tax revenue, and the ratio of public enterprise output to 
national output (see table Al in the appendix). This research resulted in conflicting 
results with respect to the relationship between the government size and the rate of 
economic growth. The conflicting results can be attributed to factors such as using 
different proxies for government size, applying different proxies for the growth rate, 
using a sample of different countries at different time periods, and using different ad 
hoc models in the absence of theoretical framework to investigate the effect of 
government involvement as well as the process of economic growth. Many factors 
triggered the wide research in these areas such as the sharp macroeconomic 
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imbalances of most countries, particularly in the developing world, the collapse of the 
command economies, and the availability of worldwide comprehensive data. 
Using cross-sectional data on 43 developed and underdeveloped countries from 
1955-70, Rubinson (1977) concluded there was a positive relationship between the 
government size, measured by the ratio of government revenue to gross national 
product (GNP) and economic growth. Employing cross-section data of 46 countries, 
Kormendi and Meguire ( 1985) found a positive, but statistically insignificant, 
relationship between economic growth and the size of government, indexed by 
government consumption as a ratio of GNP. Conte and Darrat (1988) employed time-
series data on all OECD countries from 1960-84. Their results indicated public sector 
expansion, indexed by total government outlays as a ratio of GDP, is not generally 
accountable for retarding economic growth in OECD countries. Using government 
consumption spending as an index of government size and covering 130 countries 
from 1960-85, Lin (1994) used cross-country single and simultaneous equation models 
to find government size had a positive impact on economic growth in the short run, but 
not in the intermediate one (25 years in his study). 
Ram (1986) used cross-sectional as well as time-series data on 115 developed 
and developing countries employing a two-sector, government and non government, 
production function framework based on Feder' s (1982) paper. He found a positive 
and highly significant relationship between government size and economic growth. 
Ram's (1989) later analysis resulted in a similar outcome. Employing the Denison 
growth accounting approach on cross-sectional data of 42 developing countries, 
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Diamond ( 1989) fo~nd a positive, but insignificant, relationship between the economic 
growth rate and the overall size of government, measured by the ratio of total 
government expenditures to GDP. When the structure of these expenditures was 
examined, he concluded social government expenditures on housing, health, and 
welfare exerted a positive significant effect on growth in the short run, while capital 
infrastructure expenditure had little influence on growth. On the other hand, he 
concluded that directly productive capital expenditure exerted a negative influence on 
economic growth. 
Landau (1983) used cross-sectional data covering 96 countries and found that 
government size, measured by the share of government consumption to GDP, made a 
negative contribution to economic growth. In a more comprehensive and detailed 
study, Landau (1986) found consistent results. He used pooled cross-section and time-
series data on 65 developing countries from 1960-80. When the government 
expenditure was categorized, he found that government capital expenditure was 
slightly harmful to economic growth. Using pooled cross-section data on sample of 73 
developing countries from 1960-70 and 1970-80, Singh (1985) indicated government 
intervention contributed negatively to the economic growth. He defined the state 
intervention as "the influence of governmental policies toward private industries 
including those concerning nationalization or state take-over of private activities " 
(Singh, 1985, p. 223). 
Rao (1989) reexamined Ram's (1986) model using cross-section and time-
series data covering 115 and 55 countries, respectively. He argued Ram' s (1986) 
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results about the positive relationship between government size and economic growth 
were biased due to a misspecification problem. The issue of bias in the Ram (1986) 
model was also reported by Carr ( 1989). 
Barro (1989) employed an endogenous growth model on cross-sectional data 
covering 98 countries from 1960-85, finding the size of government, proxied by the 
ratio of government consumption spending, excluding defense and education, to GOP 
has a negative impact on the economic gro~1h. Barro (1991) employed an endogenous 
growth model on cross-sectional data covering 72 countries from 1960-85, finding the 
size of government, measured by the ratio of government consumption spending, 
excluding defense and education, to GOP has a negative impact not only on the 
economic growth but also on the investment ratio, i.e., the ratio of public and private 
investment to GOP. 
Grier and Tullock (1989) employed pooled cross-section data on 113 countries 
over the period 1950-8 I, and found a negative correlation between government size, 
measured by government consumption expenditures to GOP, and the rate of economic 
growth. In a sample of I 07 countries during the period from 1970-85, Engen and 
Skinner ( 1992) used a generalized production function approach assuming a two-
sector model, taxed and untaxed, economy. They found government spending and 
taxation were negatively associated with economic growth. Using a sample of 79 
developed and developing countries, Sachs and Warner (1995) found a negative 
relationship between the growth rate and the ratio of real government consumption 
spending, net of military and education spending, to real GOP. 
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Miller (1996) employed data on 22 OCEO countries from 1960-88 using time-
series and pooled cross-section models and found the share of real government public 
expenditures in GOP may not affect the real economic growth, while the increase in 
this share may have a negative impact on the rate of economic growth. Employing a 
fixed effect model on a sample of 59 middle-income developing countries over the 
period 1960-85, Guseh ( 1997) found a negative relationship between the government 
size, indexed by the share of government consumption expenditure in GOP, and the 
rate of economic growth. Plane (1997) used probit and tobit models on a sample of 35 
developing countries and found a positive relationship between privatization, 
divestiture in particular, and economic growth. 
Easterly and Rebelo (1993) followed Barra 's (1991) cross-country regression 
and reported a negative relationship between the growth rate and the government size, 
measured as the ratio of tax revenue to GOP. However, they indicated this result was 
fragile. Using cross-sectional analysis of 45 developing countries, Yoder eta!. (1991) 
found no significant relationship between the rate of economic growth and 
privatization, measured as !-ratio of public sector spending to GNP. 
In their study of sensitivity analysis of cross-country growth regressions, 
Levine and Renelt ( 1992) employed different scenarios to investigate the relationship 
betwee.n government size and the rate of economic growth. First, they used cross-
sectional data on 64 countries and found a negative relationship between the ratio of 
government consumption expenditures to GOP and growth rate. Second, they used 
total government expenditures to GDP. Third, they used government consumption 
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share minus defense and educational expenditures. Finally, they used central 
government surplus/deficit to GDP. All the results were negative, albeit not robust. 
Using a model based on conventional demand theory framework and using time-series 
data on 20 African countries from 1960-85, Bairam ( 1990) argued whether the size of 
government, indexed by the size of total government expenditure, has positive or 
negative effects on economic growth is country specific and therefore cannot be 
generalized. 
5. East Asian Miracle and Government 
Intervention 
One of the most controversial issues in the economic literature on economic 
growth and the role of government in the economic activities centers on what is known 
as the East Asian Miracle . Eight east Asian countries, including China, Japan, Hong 
Kong, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, Thailand, and Taiwan, recorded a 
spectacular rate of rapid and sustained economic growth over the last three decades. 
These high-performing Asian economies (HPAE) outperformed the OECD economies. 
The high rates of sustained economic growth in these countries cast more 
doubt on the validity of the neoclassical growth theory. This theory is based on the 
exogeniety of the saving ratio and population growth and it assumes diminishing 
marginal productivity of inputs. Furthermore, it is assumed that technology, which is 
exogenous, is the only factor to account for economic growth. Given these 
assumptions, the theory predicts the developing countries will achieve higher rates of 
economic growth than developed countries for a certain period of time. Due to the 
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assumed diminishing returns, however, the rates of economic growth in the developing 
countries are expected to converge to a steady state. 
In the case of the r'.Gsf Asian Miracle, the convergence expected in the 
neoclassical theory did not exist. The celebrated work of Romer (1986) and Lucas 
(1988) introduced what is known as endogenous growth theory. This theory assumes 
that technological change is endogenous and emphasizes the importance of human 
capital and the accumulation of knowledge as important factors in the economic 
growth process. These factors are not subject to a diminishing return to scale, and the 
convergence, as the theory argues, is not necessary and the rates of economic growth 
are related over time. 
There is no consensus among the economists about the determinants of high 
economic growth in the HPAE. An array of explanations has been introduced 
including cultural, religious, regional, and economic factors . Nonetheless, the range 
and the effect of government interventions with respect to this outstanding 
performance has not been settled yet. The governed market theory, which is 
sometimes called the structuralist or revisionist school (e.g., Wade, 1990), argues this 
experience lends support to the state-led growth policies and emphasizes the 
importance of government intervention in achieving high rates of economic growth. 
Not only this, but this theory argues the governments in these countries deliberately 
got the prices wrong to affect the incentive system in favor of the industrial sector. 
Free market theory (e.g., Chen, 1979), which is imbued with the principles of 
the neoclassical theory, argues the state intervention in the HPAE was largely absent 
21 
and the startling performance of these economies was based on a market-led 
environment. There is also a group of economists who argue that government 
intervention in these countries had negative impacts on economic growth, which could 
have been larger in the absence of government intervention (see Krueger, 1995). 
Furthermore, there is a simulated free market theory or market friendly theory 
(e.g., World Bank, 1991; 1993) which recognizes the government intervention and 
believes this intervention was wider than the creation of the suitable growth 
environment. This theory argues the governments in these countries were simulating 
the free market. 
The World Bank (1993) acknowledges the importance of the systematic 
government intervention in these economies while emphasizing that these economies 
got the fundamentals right. These fundamentals include low level of inflation, realistic 
exchange rates, building human capital by giving much attention to the educational 
and training systems, creating effective and secure financial systems, implementing 
successful technological catch-up, limiting the price distortions, and limiting the bias 
against the agricultural sector. These economies adopted outward-oriented policies, 
achieved egalitarian distribution of income, and encouraged or forced high levels of 
domestic saving, which led to high levels of domestic investments. 
6. Theoretical Modeling 
As indicated earlier, the vast majority of empirical studies used cross-country 
models to investigate the effect of government size on economic growth. However, 
these models suffer from the following shortcomings. First, different countries have 
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different specific effects. Nonetheless, cross-country models ignore this fact and treat 
all countries as having the same characteristics. If the country-specific effects are 
correlated with the explanatory variables, there will be what is known as the omitted 
variable bias. Second, some variables might be time variant, but the time factor is 
ignored in cross-country models. Third, cross-section data provide few observations, 
which negatively affects the efficiency of econometric estimates. Because of the 
aforementioned shortcomings, the validity of cross-country studies is cast in doubt. In 
addition, Levine and Zervos (1993, pp. 426-427) argue that "cross-country regressions 
should be viewed as evaluating the strength of partial correlation and not as behavioral 
relationship that suggest how much growth will change when policies change." 
Panel data models avoid these shortcomings for the following reasons. First, 
they accommodate across-country and across-time differences. Second, they provide a 
large number of data points, which increases the degrees of freedom and improves the 
efficiency of the econometric estimates by reducing the collinearity among the 
explanatory variables. Therefore, in our study, we employ the following theoretical 
econometric model using panel data to investigate the relationship between the 
government size and the rate of growth of per capita income: 
Y,, = /3,Xu.1 + /],Xu.2 + .. ... +P,Xu.• + &u (i=I,2, .. .. ,N; t=l,2, . .. . ,7) (I) 
That is, the sample data are represented by observations on N cross-section units over 
Ttime periods. Yu is the independent variable for the ith country in the tth time period. 
X,, are explanatory variables, B "s are parameters to be estimated, and &1 is the stochastic 
disturbance. 
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In the classical linear regression model (CLRM), it is assumed the error term, 
which includes the effect of unobserved variables, is independently distributed from 
the explanatory variables. However, in the case of panel data, the omitted variables can 
be classified into three groups: (I) time-varying country-invariant, (2) country-varying 
time-invariant, and (3) country and time-varying variables. If these variables are 
correlated with the explanatory variables, the CLRM estimation yields biased 
estimates of /fs. 
Therefore, when panel data are employed, equation I can be estimated 
employing two different approaches, depending on whether the unobserved effects are 
assumed to be correlated or uncorrelated with the explanatory variables included in the 
model. These approaches are incorporated in the fixed effect model and the random 
effect model. 
Fixed Effect Model 
Fixed effect model assumes individual effects are fixed in nature (Islam, 1995) 
and uncorrelated with the error term and are treated as fixed parameters. If the problem 
is that the omitted time-varying or country-varying variables are correlated with the 
error term, the problem can be solved by adjusting the dependent and independent 
variables through transformation from individual means. Using this approach, equation 
I can be written as follows: 
Y,, = B, D;r.J + B2D;r.2 + ... .. +/], X;r.J + P2 X;r.2 + .... .+Pt X;, ,t + &;r (2) 
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where B,"s are individual specific constants, D1's are group dummy variables, and e is 
the classical stochastic disturbance with mean zero and variance o} . 
This model is estimated by using the least square dummy variable (LSDV) 
method and is based on the assumption that only the intercept parameter varies and 
this variation occurs across countries, but not over time. Hence all behavior 
differences between individual countries and over time are captured by the intercept 
(Griffiths et at., 1993). Therefore, Equation 2 can be simplified as follows : 
Y,, = li +AX,,,+ /3,Xil.2+ ..... +flXil.k + &,, (3) 
However, this model is not without caveats. First of all, if the employed sample 
is drawn from a large population, it is unreasonable to assume that differences between 
countries are nothing but parametric shifts. Second, the estimation results of this 
model cannot be generalized on countries out of the sample. Third, in case of 
correlation of both time-varying country-varying effects with the explanatory 
variables, this model cannot be estimated. 
Random Effect Model 
As mentioned earlier, the fixed effect model cannot be used when the omitted 
variables are time and country-varying. In this case the random effect model is the 
appropriate method. This model is suitable when the countries included in the sample 
have been chosen randomly to represent larger population. Consequently, this model 
deals with the individual effects as random variables. The error term has three 
components, time-specific effect (w1), country-specific effect (v;), and time and 
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country-specific effect (Jlit) . These effects are assumed to be independent of the 
regressors. The error term can be written as follows (Kmenta, 1986; Greene, 1992; 
Miller, 1996; Miller and Russek, 1997): 
(i=1,2, . ... ,N; t=1 ,2, ... . ,7) (4) 
Further, it is assumed the error term has the following properties (Kmenta, 1986; 
Greene, 1992; Miller, 1996; Miller and Russek, 1997): 
E( v,)=E( w,)=E(Jl••)=O 
E( v1 w,) =E( v1 Jlit) =£( w,Jlit) =0 
E(v1 tj )=a/, If i=j: 0 otherwise 
E(w, w,)=a/, If t=s: 0 otherwise 
E(JlitJlj,)=a/, 11' i=j and t=s ; 0 otherwise 
These implications imply Eit is homoskedastic with the following variance: 
Substituting equation 4 into equation I: 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
If the components of the error term are known, this model can be estimated 
using generalized least square (GLS). However, if these components are unknown, the 
model should be estimated using feasible generalized least square (FGLS). 
7. Data Set and Empirical Estimation 
The Data Set 
The study employs a panel data set of 30 developing countries over the period 
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I 970-90. Of these countries, 15 are low-income countries and 15 are middle-income 
countries. The countries were classified based on the World Bank classification by 
level of income in 1992-93. The countries included in the study are listed in table I . 
Figure I shows the secular growth of government size in these countries, measured by 
government consumption to GDP, over the study period. It is apparent that 
government size recorded sustained growth during the last three decades. 
The primary source of our data set is Heston and Summers (I 995). Other 
sources include the International Monetary Fund (1988) and the World Bank (1992, 
1993, and 1996). 
As mentioned earlier, the economic theory does not provide a clear framework 
to estimate the relationship between government size and economic growth and there 
is no consensus among the economists about a given framework to investigate this 
issue. Different approaches and various sets of dependent and explanatory variables 
have been employed in the existing empirical literature without proving the superiority 
of a particular one over the others. Levine and Renelt (1992, p. 942) indicated "that 
over 50 variables have been found significantly correlated with growth in at least one 
regression." 
Based on what can be deduced from the economic theory and the existing 
empirical literature, our empirical model will have the following ad hoc formulation : 
y., =a, + {Klol'l., + o/m'., + .,Opn., + )J'op., +¢(_'Ad., + BExtd., +c., (8) 
where y is the growth rate of per capita income, Govt is the size of government 
proxied by the share of government consumption expenditures in GDP, Jnv is the 
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investment share, public plus private investment, of GOP, Opn is an indicator of the 
economy openness measured by the ratio of exports plus imports to GOP, Pop is the 
annual growth rate of population, CAd is the ratio of current account deficit, before 
official transfers, to GOP, and Extd is the ratio of total external debt, private and 
public, to GOP. a , ~. o, y, A., <j), and 8 are coefficients to be estimated arid & is the 
stochastic disturbance term. 
Set of Hypotheses 
Through the estimation of this model, the following hypotheses will be tested: 
Hypothesis 1: There is a negative relationship between government size and economic 
growth, i.e., f3 has a negative sign. This hypothesized relationship is attributed to the 
inefficiency of the public sector, the crowding out effect of government expenditure, 
the price distortion because of government policies, and the deterioration in saving 
rates as a result of government budget deficits. 
Hypothesis 2: Public and private investme/11 exerts positive influence on economic 
growth, i.e., the predicted sign of 5 is positive. This is attributed to the investment role 
in capital accumulation which is vital for economic growth. It is noteworthy here that 
Levine and Renelt ( 1992) indicated that the investment rate was found to be one of the 
most robust variables in the economic growth empirics. 
Hypothesis 3: The open economies experience a high and positive rate of economic 
growth, i.e., the hypothesized sign of r is positive. The positive sign is due to the effect 
of trade openness on specialization, efficient resource allocation, economies of scale, 
and technological improvement. 
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Hypothesis -1: There is 110t an a priori relationship between the rate of economic 
growth and population growth rate, i.e., the sign of A. is unknown. The difficulty in 
predicting this sign has theoretical, as well as empirical roots. In the neoclassical 
growth theory there should be one-for-one effect of population growth on rate of 
economic growth if all countries are in a steady state of economic growth (Kormendi 
and Meguire, 1985). However, we do not have any prediction about the stage of the 
steady state in our sample of developing countries. Moreover, no significant 
correlation was found between the two variables over the last century in those 
countries now considered as developed (Simon, 1976). 
Hypothesis 5: 7here is a negative relationship between the current account deficit and 
economic growth, i.e., ¢ has a negative sign. This is attributed to the negative 
contribution of this deficit to the country foreign reserve, budget deficit, and 
vulnerability to the external shocks. 
Hypothesis 6: lhe higher the ratio of extemal debt to GDP, the lower the level of 
economic growth, i.e., the sign of() is hypothesized to be negative. This is due to the 
effects of the external debt on exchange rate, state independence, and capital outflows. 
Of course these hypotheses will be tested against the simple null hypothesis 
that no relationship exists between economic growth and each one of these 
macroeconomic variables. 
The Empirical Estimation 
First of all, we have conducted different specification tests to choose the most 
plausible model for our empirical estimation. An F-test was performed to compare the 
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performance of the fixed effect model versus the OLS model, which is the null 
hypothesis. The Lagrange multiplier (LM) test was conducted to test the random effect 
model against the OLS model, which is the null hypothesis. The Wald test was 
performed to compare the performance of the fixed effect model against the random 
effect model, which is the null hypothesis. 
The result of the F-test was in favor of the fixed effect model. Moreover, the LM 
test led to rejection of the random effect model, and the Wald test indicated the 
superiority of the fixed effect model against the random effect model. Therefore, the 
fixed effect model dominates the random effect model and the OLS model. However, 
the empirical results of the OLS, random effect, and fixed effect models are presented 
in table 2. 
It is evident the coefficient of the government size variable is negative and 
statistically significant at less than 5% level of significance. This purports that the 
larger the government size, the lower the rate of economic growth. Figure 2 plots the 
economic growth rate against the government size for the whole sample. Apparently 
the simple correlation between the two variables is strongly negative. 
The empirical results indicate there is a negative relationship between the 
economic growth rate and the current account deficit. However, this relationship is 
insignificantly different from zero. Figure 3, which shows the simple correlation 
between the current account deficit and the rate of economic growth, reflects an 
ambiguous relationship. It seems our hypothesis regarding the negative relationship 
between the ratio of external debt to GOP is not supported by the empirical estimation. 
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The coefficient of the external debt ratio to GOP is negative but statistically 
insignificant. Furthermore, figure 4, which shows the simple correlation between the 
two variables, reveals the absence of any clear cut relationship between the two 
variables. 
As indicated earlier, the investment rate was found to be one of the most robust 
variables of the economic growth empirics. This has been confirmed in our study, 
which shows a highly significant positive relationship between the rate of investment 
and the rate of economic growth. The strongly positive simple correlation between the 
two variables, as shown in figure 5, supports this result. The influence of trade 
openness on economic growth is found to be positive, but statistically insignificant. 
Nonetheless, figure 6 purports a positive simple correlation between the two variables. 
Lastly, the population growth is found to exert a negative and highly significant 
influence on the rate of economic growth. The coefficient of this variable is negative 
and statistically significant at less than 1% level of significance. In addition to that, 
when the two variables are plotted against each other in figure 7, the negative simple 
correlation between the two variables is vividly captured. This negative relationship 
can be attributed to different factors such as the increase in the dependency ratio and 
the trade ofT between the quality and quantity of human capital. 
8. Privatization--The Right Cure? 
As mentioned at the outset, privatization is one of the structural adjustment 
policies adopted in many developing countries under the auspices of some 
international agencies such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. 
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Ideally, this policy aims at improving the performance of the economy and solving the 
macroeconomic imbalances that rocked the developing economies in the last three 
decades. The question that raises itself now is, is privatization the panacea for these 
problems? If yes, how? To answer this question, we first shed light on the definition of 
the privatization and the techniques used to implement this adjustment policy. 
The privatization concept has a narrow as well as a broad definition. In its 
narrow concept, privatization means transferring the economic activities from the 
public sector to the private one by selling government-owned assets to private buyers, 
i.e., divestiture (Butler, 1986). But under its broad concept, privatization can include 
other forms of transferring the economic activities from the government to the private 
sector without affecting the property rights of the privatized public enterprises. These 
could include giving the chance to the private firms to provide services under contract, 
deregulation, build-operate-own, and build-operate-transfer. 
The implementation of the privatization policy can be achieved by using one, 
or more, of the following techniques. 
Divestiture 
The most common and controversial technique of privatization is divestiture, 
which means transferring the property and the ownership rights from the government 
to the private sector and stopping the government involvement in the privatized units. 
This method can take different forms. The most common ones are as follows. 
Direct sale of the public units. This method can be carried out using different 
mechanisms such as public auctions and tender offers. To make the public units more 
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attractive to investors and to get better offers, the government opts to restructure the 
subject units and eliminate their existing obligations. 
Debt-equity-swap. This mechanism allows the privatizing country to retire part 
of its foreign debt in exchange of equity in certain public enterprises. Usually the 
payments of dividends is not allowed before 4-5 years and the repatriation of capital is 
not allowed before 10-12 years (Ramamurti, 1992a). This mechanism, which is also 
called debt-equity-conversion, enables the country to reduce the burden of its external 
debt without reducing its foreign exchange. 
Voucher mechanism. This mechanism, which was introduced and used 
extensively in the Czech Republic, takes place when the government follows mass-
privatization. This technique is introduced when the government is not willing to 
restructure the existing public enterprises being privatized. In accord with a voucher 
scheme, each adult citizen is entitled to obtain a certain number of vouchers and use 
them to buy shares in any company undergoing privatization. These vouchers could be 
free or for a symbolic price. 
Privati;:ation by restitution. Many governments had nationalized their 
economies during the era of socialism by confiscating different production units from 
their private owners. Under the restitution mechanism, the government returns the 
confiscated properties to their former owners. Sometimes this mechanism is called 
denationalization. 
Contracting-Out 
This technique of privatization can be in one of two forms : First, the 
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government invites the private investors to bid for the right to provide the service 
under contract, i.e., leasing contract. Second, the government enters into contracts with 
private investors to manage certain government activities, i.e., management contract. 
This method is suitable for the service sector, and it can be applied for wastewater 
treatment, health facilities, garbage collection, and medical clinics (Utt, 1989). 
The governments may favor this form of privatization for many reasons. First of 
all, it decreases the riskiness of asset ownership. Second, the private sector mostly 
outweighs the public one in managerial skills as well as technical knowledge. Third, it 
has less political opposition. Lastly, these contracts are negotiable, which reduces the 
cost of errors in decision making (Andie, 1990). 
Deregulation 
Under this method of privatization, the government changes its laws and 
regulations to give the private sector the chance to invest in activities formerly 
monopolized by the public enterprises. Furthermore, the government will adopt price 
and trade liberalization so the private sector can operate on a market-led basis instead 
of a bureaucratic-led basis. As a result, the government involvement in the economic 
activities will tend to fade away over time. Some economists call this method 
privatization by attrition (Andie, 1990) or incremental privatization (El-Naggar, 1989). 
Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) 
Under this technique, if the government needs to build a project in a certain 
sector, it allows the private sector promoters to form a project company and, upon 
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securing the exclusive right from the government to earn revenue under a concession 
agreement, build the project, operate it for a period of time sufficient to pay back 
project debt and a reasonable return on equity, and then transfer the project assets back 
to the government (Hensley and White, 1993). 
Build-Operate-Own (800> 
The difference between this technique and the previous one is the private 
investor builds the project and owns it without any commitment to transfer its 
ownership and operational rights to the government. The advantage of the last two 
methods is they provide private financing to build new projects and the government 
does not have to provide either managerial participation or operating and 
administration cost associated with large-scale projects (Hensley and White, 1993). 
The Choice of the Technique 
There are different factors playing a vital role in choosing the privatization 
technique to be implemented. The most noticeable factors include the objective of 
privatization, the operational and financial background of the privatized public 
enterprises, the status of the economy, i.e., developed or developing economy, the time 
limit of the privatization program, the existence and the thickness of the capital 
market, and the availability of the desired investors. 
Country Characteristics and Privatization 
It is of vital importance to emphasize that privatization is not and should not be 
an end by itself. Privatization, as mentioned earlier, is a structural adjustment policy 
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aimed at removing the economic imbalances and improving the efficiency of the 
economy to generate positive and sustained rates of economic growth. This policy has 
swept through developed, developing, and post-communist economies. Needless to 
say, these economies have different social, political, and economic characteristics. 
These characteristics play an essential role not only in the choice of privatization 
techniques, but also in its speed, sequence, and results. Therefore, they should be taken 
into consideration before implementing privatization programs and they should be 
addressed in evaluating the success or failure of such programs. 
In developed countries, embarking on a privatization program is expected to be 
easier than that in developing countries or planned economies in transition (PETs) in 
East Europe and the former Soviet Union. Developed countries have a market-based 
economy and they are equipped with all requirements to launch successful 
privatization programs. These include established political institutions, well-defined 
property rights, well-functioning capital markets, banking system, strong juridical 
system, commercial codes, and commercial laws. In developing countries, the 
situation is different. Some of these countries lack the market-based economy and 
some are fortunate enough to have some sort of ecomarket system. In most of these 
countries, there are thick capital markets or no capital markets at all. Some of the 
developing countries have established political institutions and some are ruled by 
revolutionary authorities. However, most of these countries, which are not ruled by 
socialist regimes, have commercial codes and laws and an ecosystem of property 
rights. On the other extreme lie the PETs. These countries lack the established political 
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institutions, the market-based economy, the capital markets, the well-suited juridical 
system, the well-defined property rights, the entrepreneurial culture, and the advanced 
infrastructure. 
By virtue of hindsight, we can address the expected problems that might face 
the developing countries and the PETs in carrying out their privatization programs, 
and we can provide recommendations on how these countries can implement 
successful privatization programs. Moreover, we can evaluate the privatization 
programs that exist in these countries. 
Before embarking on privatization programs, these countries should introduce 
major institutional transformation in their social, political, and economic 
environments. Political authorities in these countries should make clear and 
unequivocal commitment to privatization program because privatization is government 
policy in the first place and this commitment will remove the uncertainty about the 
future of this program. Property rights should be established and well-defined because 
they are an integral component of the privatization process and other reforms (Brabant, 
1992). 
In addition, these countries should put in place institutional, legal, and financial 
infrastructures that market-based economies need to function properly. These include a 
banking system, mutual funds, commercial laws, commercial codes, and strong and 
credible monetary authority. Failure of these countries to provide these essential 
requirements means that privatization programs and other reforms are doomed to fail. 
As an empirical evidence on the importance of the aforementioned institutional 
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components, we provide two empirical examples. In the first, we introduce the 
pioneering United Kingdom experience in privatization. In the second, we shed light 
on the fledgling Russian experience with privatization. 
The United Kingdom privatization program started in 1979. The main 
objectives of that program included improving the economic efficiency, reducing the 
government borrowing, reducing government involvement in the economy, and 
widening the share ownership (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988). Privatization covered 
different sectors, such as the housing sector, transportation sector, oil sector, water 
sector, electricity sector, and telecommunication sector. The main techniques of 
privatization used were divestiture and contracting out. The existing market-based 
economy, the established political institution, the well-defined property rights, and the 
government commitment to the program played vital roles in the success of the 
program. The shares of many public enterprises were offered through the stock 
market, which helped in reducing the pricing problems. The government launched 
extensive public campaigns to inform the public about the privatization process and to 
encourage their participation. This resulted in an increase in the number of the British 
shareholders from 5% of the adult population in 1979 to 25% of the adult population 
in 1986 (Al-Sumadi, 1994). Other methods have been used to increase the public 
participation such as tax incentives, discount price, and cut-off point and claw-back 
mechanisms (AI-Sumadi, 1994). 
The government paid much attention to fostering competition in the market. To 
achieve this goal, some privatized public enterprises were restructured before 
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privatization. In case of natural monopolies in the utility industry, regulatory bodies 
were created to control the prices and improve competition (Al-Sumadi, 1994). The 
privatization program generated huge revenues to the government estimated at 34 
billion pounds during the period I979-9l(Al-Sumadi, 1994). 
In Russia, the privatization program took off in 1992 after the collapse of the 
former Soviet Union. In that time the economy was in a critical situation because 
neither the state bureaucracy nor the market was functioning in the economy (Ernst et 
a!., 1996). The government decided that the only way to get rid of this situation was 
shock therapy. Therefore, it launched a quick and massive privatization program 
accompanied with sharp price liberalization. However, the economy was suffering 
from the legacy of seven decades of communism. The market-based economic system 
was destroyed, the capital market was absent, commercial codes did not exist, the 
property right system was ill-suited, and above all, there were no established political 
institutions. As a result of that, immediate privatization was expected to cause lasting 
problems (Goldman, I 997). 
In the midst of weak federal authority and chaotic reforms, numerous mistakes 
have occurred. The government had to compromise with the directors of the public 
enterprise and generous privileges were given to insiders who proclaimed the 
ownership of the privatized units (Goldman, 1997). The directors of these units 
became de facto residual claimants on enterprise revenue (Ernst et a!., I 996). 
Moreover, huge public enterprises were privatized without restructuring. In the 
absence of effective anti-monopoly regulations, these enterprises simply became 
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private monopolies. 
To gain public support, the government introduced a voucher scheme. 
However, due to the unfamiliarity of the people and the lack of stock markets and 
functioning financial institutions, these vouchers were an easy target to the speculators 
and the enterprises' managers who bought these vouchers for very low prices, 
sometimes, in exchange for a bottle of vodka (Goldman, 1997). 
The irrationally high public expenditures and the mounting internal borrowing 
to finance the loss-ridden enterprises created severe financial crises (Ickes el at., 
1997). High interest rates combined with financial and political instability provided 
strong disincentives for investors (Ernst et at., 1996). While it is expected that the 
transformation from planned to market economy will result in some sort of transitory 
recession before the economy recovers again, the Russian economy still struggles 
without recovering. In 1996, after five years of reform, GOP and industrial output fell 
by 6% and 5.5%, respectively, compared to 1995 (Ickes eta!., 1997). Unemployment 
and hidden unemployment recorded I 0% of the labor force in 1994 (Ernst et at., 
1996). To sum up, we quote Ernst et at. (1996, p. 224), who described the Russian 
privatization program as follows: "Naturally, given the enormous scale of the 
undertaking, Russian privatization was a rather messy process accompanied by 
widespread irregularities, corruption, favoritism, bending of rules, and so on. " 
Keeping in mind that privatization by itself is not enough as a panacea for the 
macroeconomic imbalances, and it can be fruitful only if it is introduced in the suitable 
environment and in the right time, we proceed in figuring out how this policy can be 
the cure for many inacroeconomic imbalances plaguing developing countries. 
9. Privatization Impacts: Theoretical 
and Empirical Perspectives 
Theoretical Perspectives 
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As mentioned earlier, there are strong arguments that government size has a 
negative contribution to economic growth. Downsizing the government and curbing its 
expenditure through privatization will result in improving the economic growth. There 
are various scenarios through which privatization can compact government size. First 
of all, if the divestiture method is introduced, the size of the publ ic sector will be 
reduced noticeably, either by selling-off or liquidating its assets. Second, if the 
government adopts BOO and/or BOT, this will help the government to avoid more 
expenses in building new projects in the economy. Third, if the contracting-out 
technique is implemented, the government expenditures can be curbed through saving 
the administration costs and the subsidies, if any, to the related public enterprises. 
Finally, by deregulation, the private sector will have more incentives to invest and fill 
the gap that might surface as a result of government withdrawal from the provision of 
different goods and services. In addition, limited government regulation enables the 
private sector to operate on a market-led basis, which improves the performance of the 
economy. Privatization not only limits government size, and subsequently, its 
expenditures, but also has positive fiscal impact on the government budget through 
generated revenues or saved subsidies. 
Economic literature states the public sector has contributed to the debt crises 
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plaguing many developing countries over the last decade. Ramamurti (1992a) 
introduced the following reasons to explain high external borrowing by public 
enterprises. First, lending to public enterprises used to be a convenient way for 
multinational banks to make safe and profitable loans, because these loans were 
protected by government guarantee. Second, borrowing through public enterprises was 
a convenient way for the governments to raise foreign capital and it was likely to 
involve less public scrutiny. Third, this kind of borrowing made public enterprises less 
dependent on the government budget, which gave the chance to the government to 
become involved in many public programs that had social and political goals to play 
the role of the developmental state. 
Privatization can reduce the external debt through the following channels. 
First, debt-equity-swap. In this case, the country's foreign debt is retired in exchange 
for equity in its public enterprises. This reduces the external debt burden without 
drawing on scarce foreign exchange (Hemming and Mansoor, 1988). Second, the 
government can use the yield of direct selling of public enterprises to retire equivalent 
amount of its external debt. Third, when the existing public enterprises are privatized 
or the BOO and BOT adopted, the government will not be responsible either to borrow 
on behalf of these enterprises or to provide any guarantee to their external borrowing. 
Finally, by adopting privatization as an adjustment policy, the country might become 
eligible for some sort of debt relief programs (e.g., the Brady Plan). 
Most of the developing countries adopting privatization as an adjustment 
policy suffer from capital shortage. The level of domestic private investment is also 
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expected to be very low in these countries, which add another obstacle in the way of 
development. Privatization can contribute to solve, or at least reduce, the level of this 
economic constraint. This contribution can be explained as follows. First, privatization 
includes the creation of a new liberalized investment climate. This climate should be 
based on reforms in investment codes to encourage the domestic investors and 
minimize any constraints facing foreign investors. These reforms could include 
removing the constraint of foreign ownership and abolishing the restrictions on the 
foreign exchange transfers. Second, privatization creates numerous opportunities for 
multinational firms to invest in the privatizing country (Ramamurti, 1992b ). Third, the 
positive change in the domestic economy could be a good incentive to the return of 
flight capital held abroad. Fourth, since it is expected privatization is going to improve 
the creditworthiness of the privatizing country, this can add another incentive to the 
private investors, domestic and foreign, to invest in that country. Finally, privatization 
could play a vital role in developing the capital market and this is vital to the investors. 
The current account deficit is another economic problem many developing 
countries face. This problem is partially due to capital outflow from these countries 
because of limited investment opportunities for the private sector and the uncertain 
atmosphere in the existence of the above-mentioned imbalances. In addition, the 
unproductive imports of the public sector and the huge interest payments on the 
external debts are to be blamed. Privatization is expected to contribute positively to the 
problem through the following channels. First, by improving the economic 
productivity and enhancing the performance of exporting industries. Second, by 
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reducing the existing external debt , which reduces its service and improves the current 
account status. Finally, privatization will eliminate, or at least mitigate, the trade 
barriers and widen the degree of openness. Through deregulation, the exchange rate 
policies are expected to be managed prudently, which might stop the bias against 
domestic, exporting, and nonexporting firms. 
Empirical Perspectives 
To illustrate the empirical implications of privatization on the economy, we 
compare the economic situation in many developing countries before and after 
embarking on privatization. 
In the 1970s, public enterprises generated an average deficit of 4% of GOP in 
developing countries (Pinheiro and Schneider, 1994). In 1982, the operational deficit 
of state-owned enterprises in Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil recorded 6.9%, 6.9%, and 
4% of GOP, respectively (Pinheiro and Schneider, 1994). By 1982, the public 
enterprise sector was responsible for more than one half of the public sector deficit in 
Mexico (Teichman, 1995). Government subsidies for Polish public enterprises were 
6.7% of GOP in 1989 (Ernst el a/., 1996). These figures give us an idea about the 
burden of the public sector on government budget and show how a big government 
sector typically means high government expenditures. The huge public expenditure, 
which subsequently leads to a huge public deficit, was one of the chief rationales 
behind adopting privatizat ion as an adjustment policy in different countries. Pinheiro 
and Schneider ( 1994) indicate that privatization pol icy aimed to bring Chilean public 
deficit under control. In Mexico, privatization came in response to the macroeconomic 
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crises in the last decade, especially the public deficit (Pinheiro and Schneider, 1994). 
Drum (1993) argues privatization was initiated in Togo and Senegal to reduce the 
budget burden. Using samples of all developing countries, except high income oil 
producers, Ramamurti (1992b) found the governments of privatizing countries had 
higher budget deficits than the governments of nonprivatizing countries on average. 
There are indications privatization might be a successful cure for the budgetary 
problem of the public sector and could generate revenues to the government budget 
through downsizing the public sector and selling the loss-ridden enterprises. In Poland, 
government subsidies to the public sector were reduced to 2.2% of GOP in 1990. The 
budget deficit, which was I 0% of GOP in 1989, was essentially eliminated in 1990 
(Ernst et al., 1996). In Argentina, the public sector deficit was 15% of GOP in 1989. 
This deficit, however, was turned into a surplus in 1992 and 1993 (Roberts and 
Araujo, 1997). Teichman (1995) indicated the Mexican government budget recorded 
0.7% surplus to GOP in 1993 compared to a deficit of 16.9% ofGDP in 1982. 
As indicated earlier, public enterprises played crucial roles in the debt crises of 
many developing countries. Ramamurti (1992a) claimed as early as 1978 that public 
enterprises in the LDCs borrowed $12.2 billion in the Eurocurrency market, which 
was about one third ofLDC commercial borrowing in that year and constituted 12% of 
total international borrowing of all types. During the first half of the 1980s, public 
enterprise external debt was 14% of the total external debt in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(Katz, 1992). According to the World Bank estimates, public enterprise external 
borrowing accounted for 60% of the total external debt in Latin America in the 1980s 
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(Basile, 1990). In Venezuela, the public sector external debt recorded $26.0 billion, 
making up 75% of public sector external debt in 1984 (Ramamurti, I992a). In Mexico, 
the Pemex oil company borrowed $22.0 billion during the period 1976-8I (Roberts 
and Araujo, 1997). 
Empirical evidence suggests that privatization can reduce the external debt 
burden in the short run, as well as in the medium run. The Portuguese government's 
prepayments from privatization receipts of principal due on foreign loans helped to 
reduce external debt in relation to foreign exchanges by nearly half in just 5 years 
(Thomas, 1993). In Chile, the debt-equity-swap approach generated about $7.0 billion 
from I985-91, which absorbed approximately 30% of Chile's external commercial 
bank debt (Lieberman, 1993). The same privatization technique helped Argentina to 
reduce its external debt by $7.2 billion through the end of I991, which is 20% of the 
country's outstanding commercial bank debt (Lieberman, 1993). Western commercial 
and official lenders reduced Poland's external debt, which amounted to $45.0 billion, 
by almost 50% due to its implementation of structural adjustment policies (Ernst el a/., 
I996). By I992, Mexico trimmed its external debt by $7.2 billion as a result of its 
privatization program (Teichman, I 995). 
As for privatization influence on investment, the existing empirical studies 
revealed privatizing countries reaped the fruits. In Kenya, after 7 months of economic 
reforms, 31 joint venture projects were approved, worth approximately $75.0 million 
(Ahene, I 992). In Hungary, Ernst eta/. (I 996) indicated foreign investments increased 
from about $0.2 billion in 1989 to $2.3 and $1.3 billion in I992 and I993, 
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respectively. Chi!~ attracted more than $13 .5 billion in foreign investment between 
1974 and 1994 (Roberts and Araujo, 1997). Teichman (1995) reported during the 
period 1988-93 foreign investment in Mexico reached $40.0 billion, of which $10.0 
billion was in foreign direct investment. The investments of the privatized pension 
fund in Chile recorded $23 .0 billion (Roberts and Araujo, 1997). Finally, direct 
foreign investment in Poland recorded $3.0 billion in 1993 (Ernst eta/., 1996). 
Through privatization the economy will be more open to trade, which will 
force the domestic companies to improve their performance since they are facing 
highly efficient companies in the world market. As privatization took place in Mexico, 
trade barriers went down to 10% in 1993 compared to 100% in 1982 (Roberts and 
Araujo, 1997). Trade liberalization in Mexico led to I 0% growth in exports of 
manufacturing goods in the last 3 years of President De Ia Madrid, i.e., 1985-88 
(Roberts and Araujo, 1997). In Chile, trade liberalization resulted in 24% growth in 
exports between 1973 and 1985 (Roberts and Araujo, 1997). 
As a result of these developments in the privatizing countries, the performance 
of the subject economies had improved substantially. This improvement is represented 
in outstanding rates of economic growth. Hayami (1997) reported the economic 
growth rate in Chile was as high as 8% during 1977-81, and between 1984-1994, 
Chilean growth rate recorded real average annual rate of 6.3% (Roberts and Araujo, 
1997). Argentina' s economy grew above 5% per year in 1992 following prolonged 
stagnation since World War II (Hayami, 1997). Roberts and Araujo (1997) indicated 
that Mexico's economy grew at average of 3.5% during the period 1989-92 and 
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indicated economic growth in Peru reached 12.7% and 6.9% in 1994 and 1995, 
respectively. Poland, which embarked on privatization in 1990, suffered from 
economic decline in the first 2 years but attained growth rates of 4% and 4.5% in 1993 
and 1994, respectively (Ernst eta!., 1996). 
10. Conclusions 
In this essay, we have employed a panel data approach to investigate the 
relationship between government size and economic performance in terms of 
economic growth. Different specification tests have been conducted to choose the 
most appropriate model for our empirical investigation. The fixed effect model proved 
to be the most plausible one. The results of this model lend support to the argument 
that the larger the government size, the worse the economic performance. We also 
found that the empirical evidence in some privatizing countries indicates the positive 
role that privatization can play in mitigating the macroeconomic imbalances that have 
been plaguing the developing countries since the early 1980s. As a result, privatization 
improved the level of economic performance and enabled the privatizing countries to 
achieve positive and noticeable rates of economic growth. Therefore, privatization 
should be in the core of any structural adjustment program aims to resurrect the 
economy from various harsh macroeconomic imbalances. 
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Table I . Developing countries included in the study 
Country Country Codc1 Country Region 
Low Income Group 
Bangladesh BGD Asia 
Benin BEN Africa 
China CHN Asia 
Egypt EGY Africa 
Ghana GHA Africa 
Honduras HND Central America 
India IND Asia 
Indonesia IDN Asia 
Kenya KEN Africa 
Lesotho LSO Africa 
Mali MLI Africa 
Nicaragua NIC Central America 
Nigeria NGA Africa 
Pakistan PAK Asia 
Sri Lanka LKA Asia 
Middle Income Group 
Algeria DZA Africa 
Bra1jl BRA South America 
Chile CHL South America 
Ecuador ECU South America 
Gabon GAB Africa 
Jordan JOR Asia 
Korea KOR Asia 
Mexico MEX North America 
Peru PER Sou~1 America 
Syria SYR Asia 
11miland THA Asia 
Trinidad and Tobago TTO Central America 
Turkey TUR Europe 
Uruguay URY South America 
Country codes arc based on Heston and Summers (1995) 
57 
Table 2. /'arameter estimates of the growth equation from the pooled sample, 
1970-90 
Variable OLS Fixed effect Random effect 
Constant -0.00124 0.06231 
(-2 .511) (3 .890) 
Govt -0.00015 -0.00454 -0.00158 
(-0.336) (-5 .512) (-2 .955) 
Cad 0.00002 -0 00025 -0.00010 
(0.149) (-0.477) (-0.217) 
Extd 0.00095 -0.00003 0.00002 
(2.083) (-0.205) (0. 139) 
Inv 0.00005 0.00210 0.00089 
(0.435) (2.591) (1 .827) 
Opn -1.07380 0.00017 0.00006 
(-4 .032) (0 .624) (0.520) 
Pop -1.48420 -1.13338 
(-4.450) (-4 .092) 
F-test 1.87 
LMtest 0.05 
Wald test 28.48 
R2 0.06 0.14 0.06 
*Figures in parentheses are asymptotic !-ratios for the corresponding coefficients. 
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Appendix 
Wagner's Law 
Consider an economy of two sectors, i.e., government and nongovernment 
sectors, respectively. The utility function for a representative consumer in this 
economy can be written as follows : 
U=U(G, NG) (AI) 
where G donates government produced goods and services and NG donates 
nongovernment produced goods and services. 
Max U=U(G. NG) (A2) 
Subject to: 
(AJ) 
where I is the consumer income 
Pc dG+PNc dNG=dl (A4) 
l 'adG I~.GdNG dl 
--+---=-
dl dl dl 
(AS) 
I~G I dG PN(J NG I JNG 
--x-x-+---x-x--=1 
I G dl I NG dl (A6) 
Let Kc and /("u denote the share of government and nongovernment in 
consumer income, respectively. 
Let T)u and T)Nu denote income elasticity of demand for government and 
nongovernment produced goods and services, respectively. Under the assumption of 
full employment, the income elasticity of demand for all goods and services produced 
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in the economy is. unity (Johnson, 1973). Therefore, equation A6 can be written as 
follows : 
(A7) 
This equation implies that the weighted average of income elasticities is equal to L 
dKa 
Therefore, if 'Ia )I, d/ )0 
Baumol's Effect 
PG 
dKa- d( ~ ) 
dl - dl 
(AS) 
(A9) 
(AIO) 
(All) 
(AI2) 
Let us consider an economy with two sectors, i.e. , government sector and 
nongovernmentn sector. Figures A I and A2 represent the demand for and supply of 
government and nongovernment goods and services, respectively. Since the numerairs 
are chosen arbitrarily, it is assumed that Po=PNc;= L 
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If the income elasticity of demand for government produced goods and services, 
i.e., T]a, is greater than unity, the income elasticity of demand for nongovernment 
produced goods and services, i.e., T]Na, should be less than unity. Therefore, if real per 
capita income increased, the Do will shift to the right more than DNa as portrayed in 
figures AI and A2, respectively. Given the assumption that the government sector is 
less capital intensive than the nongovernment one, the supply function for the former 
will shift to the right less than that of the latter as shown in figures AI and A2, 
respectively. The net result will be an increase in the price of government produced 
goods and services from Po to P0 1 and a decrease in the price of nongovernment 
produced goods and services from PNa to PNa 1 
Proof 
(Al4} 
Let m and r denote the price of labor and capital, respectively, 
(A IS} 
(AJ6) 
Let B1 (i =L,K) denote the share of input i in producing a dollar worth of goods 
and services, 
' ' ' P a = BL.a m+ BK.a r (A17) 
' ' ' PN a = BL.NG m+ BK.NG r (A18) 
As assumed in this hypothesis fh.o>BL.NG and BK.o<BK.NG 
' Assume now that r = 0, from equations A 17 and A 18: 
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(A19) 
But (A20) 
From equation Al9: 
(A21) 
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Table AI. Government size in economic [{!_'OIVIh reK!·essions 
Government 
Study Period Data D.V. Size Index Relationshi~ 
Bairman (90) 1960-85 T-S GDP GE +/-
Barro (89) 1960-85 C-S PGDP8 GC (d&e) 
Barro (91) 1960-85 C-S PGDP8 GC (d&e) 
Conte and 1960-84 T-S GDP8 GE +I-
Darrat (89) 
Diamond (89) 1980-85 C-S GDP8 GE + 
Easterly and 1970-88 C-S &P PGDP8 TR 
Rebelo (93) 
Engen and 1970-85 C-S GDP8 G&TR 
Skinner (92) 
Grier and 1951-80 C-S GDP8 GC 
Tullock (89) 
Guseh (97) 1960-85 p GDP• GC 
Kormendi and 1950-77 C-S GDP8 GE + 
Meguire (85) 
Landau (83) 1961-76 C-S PGDP8 GC 
Landau (86) 1960-80 C-S PGDP8 GC 
Lin (94) 1960-85 C-S PGDP8 GC + 
Miller (96) 1960-88 p PGDP8 GC 
Ram (86) 1960-80 T-S& GDP8 GC + 
C-S 
Ram (89) 1960-85 C-S GDP8 GC + 
Rubinson (77) 1955-70 C-S GNP• GR + 
Sachs and 1970-89 C-S PGDP8 GC(d&e) 
Werner (95) 
Singh {85} 1960-80 C-S GDP8 SI 
D.V.: Dependent variable, T-S: Time-series, C-S : Cross-section, P: Panel data, GDP: 
Level of GDP, GDP8: Growth rate of GDP, PGDP8: Growth rate of GDP per capita, 
GE: Total government expenditure, GC: Government consumption expenditure, GR: 
Government revenue, Sl: Indicator of government policy including its role in the 
economy and nationalization, TR: Tax revenue to GDP. 
+(-): Positive (negative) relationship,+/-: The relationship is country specific. 
(d&e): Excluding defense and education expenditures. 
Fig. A I. Demand and supply of 
government goods and services 
Fig. A2. Demand and supply of 
nongovernment goods and services 
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ESSAY II : PRIVATIZATION AND TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY: 
I . Abstract 
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY ON INTERNATIONAL OIL 
INDUSTRY USING A STOCHASTIC 
FRONTIER APPROACH 
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This essay measures the firm-specific technical efficiency for a sample of 44 
publicly owned and privately owned petroleum companies in the international oil 
industry. The empirical investigation is carried out by using the stochastic frontier 
production function approach. The results indicate the private decision-making units in 
the oil industry outperformed their publicly owned counterparts in terms of technical 
efficiency. The implication is privatization can improve the performance of the 
transformed public enterprises. 
2. Introduction 
Since the beginning of the 1970s, the movement toward privatization has 
gained considerable attention in both developed and developing countries. In many 
cases, poor performance of the public sector has been the dominant factor behind this 
movement. Privatization has different meanings. Generally it means shifting the 
control of economic activities from public bureaucrats to private entrepreneurs. 
However, there are numerous mechanisms to implement this policy. It could take the 
form of divestiture, contracting-out, deregulation, the build-operate-own approach, the 
build-operate-transfer approach, or many other forms. Although in manufacturing 
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industries there h~s been significant progress toward privatization (UNIDO, 1992; 
World Bank, 1996}, the movement toward privatization has been somewhat slow and 
limited in the oil industry worldwide. This can be attributed to the strategic importance 
of oil in the civil and military sectors, as well as a perception that production of 
strategically important resources should not be left to the private sector. 
It is presumed public enterprises are technically and economically inefficient 
compared to their counterparts in the private sector. In this essay we examine the 
technical inefficiency of production units in the oil industry located in different 
countries. It is generally argued the incentive system in the private sector ensures 
efficiency, whereas in the public sector the incentive schemes designed to spur 
efficient managerial behavior are ineffectual and inconsistent and hence generate 
inefficiency, but the empirical studies do not always give evidence in support of this 
proposition. While there are some studies which indicate private enterprises are 
technically more efficient than public ones, other studies indicate the opposite. 
In view of these conflicting evidences, there is an apparent need for further 
examination of this issue on a case by case basis, which is the motivation for this 
essay. We intend to confine our analysis to the oil industry, where we have large 
international (private and state) enterprises producing almost homogenous outputs, i.e., 
oil, using the same technology, and competing in the global markets. The stochastic 
frontier production function approach is employed using different specifications of the 
distribution of the one-sided error term. These specifications are half-normal, 
truncated-normal, and exponential distributions. 
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The rest of this essay is organized as follows : we briefly discuss why the public 
sector generates inefficiencies in section 2. Section 3 provides cursory review of the 
empirical literature on privatization and technical efficiency. Section 4 sheds light on 
the current status of international privatization in the oil industry. The concept of 
technical efficiency is introduced in section 5. Section 6 introduces the theoretical 
modeling. The description of the data set and the empirical estimations are reported in 
section 7. The concluding remarks are included in section 8. 
3. Public Sector Inefficiency 
After World War II, many countries wanted to achieve economic development 
through planning. At that time, the Soviet model of development was followed and the 
public sector was entrusted with the task of achieving numerous social and economic 
objectives. After passing the take-ofT stage, it became clear the overextended public 
sector did not function efficiently and the dominance of the public sector was 
perceived as an obstacle to economic growth and performance. The poor performance 
of this sector resulted in economic imbalances, external and internal deficits, and a 
high level of external debt in many countries. As a reaction to these developments, 
privatization emerged as an alternative to public or bureaucratic management of 
economic activities. Before we proceed, we will briefly discuss why the public sector 
as a mode of organizing economic activities may face difficulties. 
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Property Rights Theory 
Alchain (1965) argued the difference in property rights between public and 
private firms could result in different levels of efficiency in the two sectors. The 
central point of this argument lies in the transferability of the property rights. If the 
stockholders of a certain company in the private sector are not satisfied with the 
performance and the management of the firm, they can vote this management out or 
sell their shares. This could result in concentration of the shares in the hands of a new 
group that might try to take over the current management. However, this is not the 
case in the public sector where the ownership is involuntary and nontransferable. The 
owners, i.e., the taxpayers, have no control over the net profits and have no authority 
to vote the management of the public enterprise out if they are not satisfied with its 
performance. As a result, the taxpayers tum out to be weak owners and have no 
incentive to monitor the performance of the public sector units and in the absence of 
any threat to take over, inefficiency is generated. 
Principal-Agent Dilemma 
The principal-agent dilemma emerges due to the asymmetric information 
between the agent and the principal, because each one possesses different information 
unknown to the other and nature adds noise to the process (Carlos, 1992). In the case 
of the public sector, we find the principals, i.e., the taxpayers, have neither the 
knowledge nor the means to evaluate the performance of the management of public 
enterprises. This spurs the managers not only to shirk, but also to pursue their personal 
agenda without being worried about the performance of the whole enterprise. 
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Political Intervention 
It is generally argued the government uses the public sector as an instrument to 
achieve various sociopolitical goals in addition to the economic ones. This results in 
government interference in the decision-making process of the public enterprises. 
Therefore, pricing, employment, and production policies are not determined by the 
market forces, but are decided by a group of bureaucrats, who are removed from 
realities of production. 
Ambiguous Goals and Objectives 
As mentioned earlier, the public enterprises usually try to attain a host of 
economic and social objectives. In most cases, these objectives are poorly defined and 
often conflict with each other. This results in inefficient use of the available resources. 
Poor Incentive System 
The incentive system in the public sector is rigid and poor. Usually salaries are 
paid according to a specified wage scale regardless of the efficiency of the employees. 
In addition, the promotion system is inflexible and depends on the years of service. 
This leaves the public servants with no real incentives to maximize the profit or 
minimize the cost. 
4. Literature Review 
In the last two decades, ample research existed to measure and compare the 
level of technical efficiency in the public and the private sectors in various areas of the 
production of goods and services. These studies have shown mixed results and it is 
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difficult to get a clear picture about the relative performance of one sector over the 
other. Employing cross-section framework on a sample of 44 fire departments in the 
states of Arizona and Washington, Ahlbrandt (1973) found the private firms were 
much more efficient than the public ones in the provision of fire services. Bennet and 
Johnson (1979) compared the efficiency of 29 private and public trash collection 
companies in Fairfax County, Virginia, where they found ample evidence the private 
sector was more efficient than the public sector. AI-Obaidan and Scully ( 1992) 
employed the Aigner-Chu deterministic frontier, stochastic frontier, and maximum 
likelihood gamma frontier techniques to investigate the efficiency in the international 
petroleum companies. They found public firms were 14 percentage points lower than 
their private counterparts in the international petroleum industry in terms of technical 
efficiency. 
The World Bank study (1996) of 61 privatized units in developed and 
developing economies indicated the operating efficiency increased considerably after 
privatization. The largest number of studies in the United States about the electricity 
industry found the private units were more efficient than their public counterparts 
(Pollitt, 1995). Employing a stochastic frontier production function approach with 
panel data over the period 1973-85 in the Northern Ireland manufacturing sector, 
Sheehan ( 1997) reported the government financial assistance for employment for the 
manufacturing firms had negative contributions to technical efficiency in the Northern 
Ireland manufacturing sector. Kalirajan and Zhao ( 1997) used a stochastic frontier 
approach with panel data to asses the effect of economic reforms on China's state 
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enterprises. They reported significant improvement in technical efficiency during the 
period 1986-89. Plane ( 1997) used probit and tobit models on a sample of 35 
developing countries over the period 1988-92 to find privatization contributed 
positively to technical efficiency gains. Boussofiane el a/. (I 997) employed a data 
envelopment analysis (DEA) technique to measure technical efficiency of nine 
privatized firms in Britain, including British Gas. In some cases, including British 
Gas, they found a positive effect of privatization on the level of technical efficiency. 
However, in other cases there was no discernible impact of ownership on 
performance. 
Millward ( 1988) indicated there was no empirical evidence for a statistically 
significant effect of ownership form on the level of technical efficiency. Moreover, 
Tittenbrun ( 1994) argued the ownership is irrelevant and the nationalized industries 
can often be more efficient than those that are privately owned. Bhattacharyya el a/. 
(1994) used a cost function approach on a sample of225 public and 32 private water 
utilities in 1992 and found the average technical efficiency of public and private water 
utilities was 37% and 35%, respectively. Pescatrice and Trapani (1980) employed a 
cross-section analysis on a sample of 33 private firms and 23 public firms in the area 
of electricity generation over the period 1965-70. Their empirical research indicated 
publicly owned electric utilities perform better than their privately owned regulated 
counterparts. However, Atkinson and Halvorsen ( 1986) used a cross-sectional cost 
function model on a sample of 123 privately owned and 30 publicly owned electric 
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utilities operating i'n the United States in 1970. They indicated publicly and privately 
owned electric utilities were equally inefficient. 
Pollitt ( 1995) used parametric and nonparametric techniques on a sample of 
768 thermal electric power plants operating in 14 countries in 1989 and found no 
difference in technical efficiency between public and private firms in the electric 
power industry. Fare et at. ( 1985) used the same data set of Atkinson and Halvorsen 
(1986) employing a nonparametric linear programming approach and found publicly 
owned electric utilities to be more technically efficient than the private ones. In the 
light of these contradicting results, some economists argue the link between ownership 
and technical efficiency is industry specific (Pollitt, 1995). Others argue the efficiency 
gains are more likely to result from an increase in the market competition than from a 
change in ownership (Cook and Kirkpatrick, 1988). 
5. Privatization in the International 
Oil Industry 
Privatization policy swept through developed, as well as developing economies, 
and covered numerous areas in economic activity. These include, but are not limited 
to, banking, transportation, education, telecommunication, electricity, garbage 
collection, corrections, and housing. The progress and the scale of its implementation 
in the oil industry were limited worldwide until the beginning of this decade. This 
might be attributed to the strategic importance of this commodity in civil as well as 
military activities, which makes the economic and national stability sensitive to the 
developments in this industry. This was evident during the 1973 oil crisis, the oil crisis 
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of 1979-80 in the aftermath of Iraq-Iran war, and recently in 1989-90 during the 
second Gulf crisis. 
The first worldwide privatization in the oil industry took place in Britain in 
1977 and was completed in 1987. This I 0-year process resulted in the sale of British 
Petroleum, Oil Enterprise, Britoil, and British Gas. Mexico took slow and limited 
steps in the late 1980s to downsize the giant national oil company PEMEX (Teichman, 
1995). However, a substantial part of the activities in the Mexican oil industry is still 
under the direction of PEMEX. Argentina was the first country in South America to 
take serious privatization measures in the oil industry when the government sold its 
assets in the energy sector. This process included the privatization of transmission and 
distribution of natural gas, as well as the privatization of the national oil company, 
YPF, which was privatized gradually in 1992 and 1993 and generated $6.65 billion in 
revenue (Hoopes, 1997). Moreover, the lease technique was used to privatize the 
marginal areas in the Argentine oil sector (Aleman, 1996). In Italy, the government 
started the privatization process in 1992 also. The state petrochemical company, ENI, 
was privatized and the proceeds of that process were expected to reach $30 billion 
(Turco, 1996). 
In France, the biggest privatization activity was the sale of the majority of the 
government share holdings in Elf Aquitaine oil company in 1994 (Wardle and Towle, 
1996). The Bolivian state-owned petroleum company, YPFB, which provided half of 
the Bolivian government's revenues, underwent privatization process in 1995 (Oil and 
Gas Journal, 1995a; Crow, 1996). In late 1995, the Brazilian constitution was 
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amended to end the 40-year monopoly of the national oil company Petrobras (Crow, 
1996). In Belgium, the government sold its 50% stake in the main supplier of gas in 
the country (Kmiecik and Gourley, I 996). To increase levels of efficiency and cut 
waste, Portugal's state-owned oil company (Petrogas) embarked on privatization in 
1995 (Oil and Gas Journal, !995b). 
In addition to these developments, the collapse of the command economies in 
East Europe and the dissolution of the former Soviet Union contributed to foster and 
widespread the international oil privatization. Koen (1995) indicated many petroleum 
enterprises have been transformed to join stock companies in Kazakhstan. 
Furthermore, the door has been open for foreign investors wishing to invest in the 
Kazakh petroleum industry. In Hungary, the government sold the major companies in 
the oil supply and distribution, and raised around $2.5 billion (Wardle and Towle, 
I 996) and the former East Germany sold the main oil company (Minol) to Elf 
Aquintie (Kmiecik and Gourley, 1996). As part of its post-communist economic 
reforms, Romania started restructuring its petroleum monopolies and provided 
channels to domestic and foreign private investment in the oil industry (Crow, I 995). 
Furthermore, it is expected that more New Independent States (NIS) in the former 
Soviet Union, such as Latvia and Lithuania, will adopt privatization programs in their 
oil industries (Wardle and Towle, 1996). In addition, Taiwan, the Philippines, and 
Greece showed some interest in privatizing their oil industries (Wardle and Towle, 
1996). 
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6. Definition of Technical Efficiency 
Technical (managerial) efficiency can be defined as the ratio of realized output 
to the maximal potential output given a set of inputs, or the ratio of minimal potential 
inputs to observed inputs necessary to produce a given level of output. Moreover, 
some economists indicate that a producer is technically efficient if an increase in any 
output requires a reduction in at least one other output or an increase in at least one 
other input and if a reduction in any input requires an increase in at least another input 
or a reduction in at least one output (see Lovell, 1993). Debreu (1951) and Farrell 
(1957) suggested another definition of technical efficiency as one minus the maximum 
equiproportionate reduction in all inputs still allowing continued production of given 
output (see Lovell, 1993). Battese and Coelli (1988) defined technical efficiency of a 
given firm as the ratio of its mean production (in original units), given its realized firm 
effect, to the corresponding mean production if the firm effect was zero. Therefore, the 
technical efficiency of the ith firm can be defined as follows : 
m = E(r,,· /u;.Xu.l = 1,2, ... ) 
E(Y,,./U; = 0, x., ,t = 1,2, . ) (9) 
where r·u denotes the value of production (in original units) for the ith firm in the llh 
period of time. 
7. Theoretical Modeling 
Following the pioneering work of Farrell (1957), a lot of research has been 
done in the area of measurement of technical efficiency of different decision-making 
units. In this research, two different approaches were applied: the parametric approach 
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(e.g. , Aigner and Chu, 1968; Meeusen and van den Broeck, 1977; Aigner eta!. , 1977) 
and the nonparametric or mathematical programming approach (e.g., Fare and Lovell , 
I 978; Charnes eta!., I 978; Fare eta!., I 985; Bjurek eta!., I 990). The advantages of 
the parametric approach are based on its ability to provide detailed information about 
the technical efficiency of each firm in the sample and to distinguish the effect of the 
normal statistical noise from the technical inefficiency effect. However, this approach 
imposes some restrictions on the functional form of the model and also on the 
stochastic specifications of the disturbance term. Thus there is the possibility of 
making specification errors (Al-Obaidan and Scully, I 992). 
On the other hand, the nonparametric approach needs no explicit restrictions to 
be imposed on the data and it appears to be a more robust procedure for efficient 
frontier estimation (Seiford and Thrall, 1990). Nonetheless, this approach does not 
distinguish between the inefficiency effects and the effects of the stochastic shocks, 
which are outside the control of the firm and it lumps the two effects together as an 
indicator of inefficiency. Furthermore, this approach is very sensitive to the variable 
selection and data errors (Leibenstein and Maital, 1992). In this essay, the parametric 
approaches will be applied using different specifications of the distribution of the one-
sided error term. Moreover, the comparison between the results of each specification 
will be conducted. 
Aigner and Chu (1968), hereafter A-C, were the first to introduce the 
deterministic frontier function by applying the following Cobb-Douglas production 
function: 
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Yo= AXt xfu (10) 
where y0 is the maximum output produced using the two inputs X, and X2; A, a, and /3 
are parameters to be estimated; and U is the normal stochastic noise. It is assumed the 
differences of technical efficiency are subsumed within the disturbance term. A-C 
(1968) estimated equation I 0 such that: 
... "' a p Yo= AX, X, ~Yo (11) 
They suggested two alternatives to estimate the parameters of this equation. The 
first is a linear programming method based on minimizing the sum of absolute 
residuals, and the second is based on minimizing the sum of squared residuals, that is, 
a quadratic programming method. In both alternatives, the residuals were constrained 
to be negative. The weakness of this method is in the assumption that the error term is 
deterministic while really it could be stochastic. Given this specification, the firm 
could be considered as efficient when, in fact, it is not and vice versa. Furthermore, 
these methods of estimation have neither statistical assumptions nor properties of 
estimators. To handle these problems, Schmidt (1976) amended A-C (1968) 
specification by adding a random disturbance to account for the various factors 
resulting in less than maximum attainable level of production. Schmidt ( 1976) model 
was in the following double-log specification: 
In Y, = a+ f31n X, - c, (12) 
where Y, denotes the maximum level of output given a certain set of inputs, i.e., X;, a , 
and P are parameters to be estimated, and e; is the stochastic term that measures the 
deviation of the firm from its production frontier and its value is ~o. which means 
81 
that all observations' must lie on or below the frontier. Schmidt also assumed that Ei are 
independently and identically distributed as N (Jl,cr2) . 
Schmidt ( 1976) pointed out under particular assumptions about the distribution 
of e , i.e., exponential or half-normal distributions, maximum likelihood techniques 
can be employed. However, imposing a one-sided disturbance error in equation 12 
creates a major problem with maximum likelihood estimation because it forces the 
level of the dependent variable, output in this case, to depend on the parameters being 
estimated which violates one of the regulatory conditions imposed to prove that 
maximum likelihood estimators are consistent and asymptotically efficient (see, for 
example, Aigner eta/., 1977; Broek eta!., 1980; Forsund eta/., 1980). 
Aigner et a/. (1977}, Battese and Corra (1977}, and Meeusen and van den 
Broeck ( 1977) introduced a stochastic frontier production function in the following 
modeling: 
.!'; = F(X, .P)e' (13} 
where Yi , Xi, and 13 are defined as in equation 12 above, and Ei is the composed error 
term. It is postulated that this error term is composed as follows: 
i=I , ... ,N (14) 
This error term is composed of symmetric stochastic disturbance, vi, which 
captures the effect of the random factors outside the control of the firm in addition to 
the measurement errors and statistical noise, and the IIi component, which captures the 
effect of technical inefficiency. Aigner eta/. (1977, p. 24) justified the composition of 
the error term as follows : "The economic logic behind this specification is that the 
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production process is subject to two economically distinguishable random 
disturbances with different characteristics." 
It is assumed v; are independently and identically distributed as N(O,cr2 v ) and 11; 
are independently and identically distributed of v; . Moreover, it is assumed that the 
stochastic component of the error term is two-sided, i.e., -cxKv;<ao and 11; is a one-sided 
non-negative component, i.e., 11; 2:0, and this non-negative component of the error term 
is distributed as the absolute value of a normal distribution, N(O,cr2 u ) , i.e. , half-
normal. Aigner el a/. ( 1977) considered also the case where - II; has an exponential 
distribution. The merit of this model is its flexibility to differentiate between the error 
measurement and the random shocks outside the firm control and level of inefficiency 
of the firm relative to the stochastic frontier. 
Empirically, different firms have different levels of output. Thus, while some 
firms produce on their stochastic frontier, i.e., 11;= 0 , others produce inside their 
stochastic frontier, i.e., 11;>0 . The first group are technically efficient firms since they 
know the correct technical relationships between inputs and output. In other words, 
these firms know their production coefficients, enabling them to produce on their 
stochastic frontier. For some firm-specific factors, the other group was unable to attain 
the maximum attainable level of output. Therefore, they fell short of their stochastic 
frontier, i.e., these firms are producing inefficiently (see Kalirajan and Zhao, 1997). 
Given equation 9 above, technical efficiency can be modeled as follows: 
Therefore 
f(x,, ,p)e''• -•• 
TE f (x., ,p)e"• 
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(15) 
(16) 
Aigner e/ al. ( 1977) indicated the joint density function of the composed error 
term has the following specification: 
2 • & • I /(&) =-f (- )(! - F (&i!CT )] , CT CT -aoSt;S+ao (17) 
where cr2=cr.Z+cr/, !..=aula,., and /(.) and F'(.) are the standard normal density and 
distribution functions, respectively. This density is symmetric around zero with mean, 
and variance, 
.J2 
E(!; )= E( u )=- Jff CT. 
n-2 V(~;)=V(u)+V(v)= (----rf )a.'+ a.-' 
Consequently, the relevant log-likelihood function for this system is: 
2 .J2 _, f .. I I f 2 ln f (yp,i!,a )=Nln r;:;-+Nlna +L)n[l - 1· (&,i!a )]--2 L..&i 
"n ,,, 2a 1=1 
(18) 
(19) 
(20) 
The maximum likelihood estimators are obtained by direct maximization of 
equation 20 with respect to the parameters ~. /-.., and cr. However, while these models 
were able to estimate the mean of technical inefficiency of the firms under study, they 
failed to measure the individual effect as well as to decompose the error term E; into 
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separate estimates of the components 11; and v;. Jondrow eta/. (1982) were the first to 
solve this important problem. They proved technical efficiency for individual firms 
can be predicted by using the distribution of the inefficiency term, II;, conditional on 
the estimate of the entire composed error term, E; , given the parameters of the frontier 
production function were known and cross-sectional data were available for sample 
firms (Battese and Coelli, 1988). For half-normal distribution, Jondrow et a/. (1982) 
pointed out the joint density of 11 and v is nothing but the product of their individual 
densities since they are independent, this density being written as: 
I -1 I 
/(ll,v)=--exp[--2 112 ---, v' ],u<>oO 
1fU14 a" 2a11 2a" 
(21) 
Making the transformation lFV-11, the joint density of 11 and e is: 
I -1 I 
f(u ,e)=--exp[--2 11 2 - - -2 (u ' +&2 +2ue], Tra,a,, 2a... 2a .. (22) 
Given the density function of e in Aigner eta/. (1977) in equation 17 above, 
the conditional density of 11 given E will be as follows: 
I I -1 I ..1.2 f(ue)= ~-Fexp[--, u ' ---2 11e---, e 2 ],11 <>o O 
..;2Tr:a, 1- ' 2a, 2a. 2a 
(23) 
After some algebraic manipulation, we get: 
I I -1 f(u e)= ~ -F exp[--2 (11 +a; e/ a ' }2 ],11 ;:, 0 
..;2Tr:a, 1- ' 2a, 
(24) 
By replacing g and cr. by their estimates in equations 13 and 24, we can derive 
estimates for the components of the error term. Further, equation 16 can be estimated. 
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8. Data Set and Empirical Estimation 
The Data Set 
The study uses a data set from 44 state owned and privately owned 
international petroleum companies. The data were published in Fortune magazine 
(1982a, 1982b) and have been used previously by Al-Obaidan and Scully (1992). Of 
the 44 firms, 17 are publicly owned and 27 are privately owned companies. The 
government ownership percentage in the public companies ranged from 35% to 100%. 
A list of these firms with further details is reported in table 3. 
The Empirical Estimation 
To avoid the specification error about the form of the function, we carried out 
the Lagrange multiplier (LM) test to test whether the functional form of the production 
function is of Cobb-Douglas technology against the alternative hypothesis, the 
following translog functional form: 
LnQ, =Po+ fJ,I.nK, + {J,_LnL, + B3(LnL,)' +B. (LnK, )2 + B, (LnL1LnK1 ) + v, -u, 
(25) 
Under the null hypothesis, Jh=P4=Ps=O. If this hypothesis is not rejected, the 
nonrejection favors the simple Cobb-Douglas functional form, which is a special case 
of the above model. Hence, we choose among the nested models, in the sense that one 
model, i.e., the Cobb-Douglas, is a special case of the translog model. The x2 statistic 
was 5.91. Hence we failed to reject the null hypothesis at any conventional level of 
significance and we adopted the following Cobb-Douglas technology: 
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(26) 
where Q; is the value of sales in dollars for the ith firm, L; is the number of employees 
in the ith firm, K; is the level of capital for the ith firm, and II; and v; are as defined 
above. The value of total assets was used as a proxy for the level of capital due to the 
lack of data. Summary statistics of the data on the different variables are listed in table 
4. 
The main null hypothesis to be tested after the estimation of this model is that 
private and public petroleum companies are equally technically efficient. This means 
that the form of ownership has no effect on the level of technical efficiency in the 
decision-making units in the oil industry. 
The maximum likelihood estimates for model 26 are reported in table 5. This 
model has been estimated under the assumptions of half-normal, truncated-normal, 
and exponential distribution of the one-sided error term II;. The first two were 
proposed by Aigner eta!. (1977) and Meeusen and van den Brock (1977). These 
specifications assume II; has zero mode. The third specification proposed by Stevenson 
(1980) is more flexible with the assumption II ; has a non-zero mode. 
It is evident that the results of both half-normal and truncated-normal 
specification are identical. Therefore, we will compare the results of the former with 
these of the exponential specification. In both cases, the coefficient of LnK; was 
positive and highly significant, indicating the importance of this input in increasing the 
level of output. On the other hand, the lnL; coefficient was positive but statistically 
insignificant at conventional levels. This could be an indication of surplus labor in the 
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oil industry, especially in public firms, which had presumably more labor employed, 
on average. Furthermore, the estimated coefficients indicate there is decreasing return 
to scale in the oil industry. 
The ratio of the standard errors of II; and v;, i.e., A., was 1.65<3> implying the 
one-sided error component dominates the symmetric error component. In other words, 
the greater part of residual variation in the firm output is attributable to variations in 
technical efficiency. This ratio was 0.98 for the exponential specification. This means 
inside factors, i.e., technical efficiency factors, and outside factors had, almost, equal 
effect on the residual variation in the firm output. In addition to that, y = cr/lcr2 = [A.2 
/(I+A.2)], which measures the technical inefficiency effect in the observed output 
variation, was 0. 74 and 0.49 for half-normaJ<4> and exponential specifications, 
respectively. This implies 0. 74 and 0.49 of the discrepancies between potential level of 
output and the observed output are due to technical inefficiencies. 
After decomposing the residuals into estimates of II; and v;, the level of 
technical efficiency for the individual firms was calculated. The efficiency ratings for 
the whole sample, based on different specifications for the distribution of the one-
sided error term, are reported in tables 6, 7, and 8. Table 9 summarizes the frequency 
distribution of technical efficiency score for public and private firms as well as for the 
~--·----
3In half-normal case, var(u)=cru2 (7tf2-l) 
4For half-normal, cr2=(cr/(7tf2-I)+ cr/) and the numerator is as defined in 3. 
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whole sample. As table 9 reveals, based on the exponential distribution, the mean of 
technical efficiency for the whole sample was 0. 76 and the firm-specific level ranged 
from 0.38 to 0.93. This reflects 0.24 shortfall in observed output compared to the 
maximal (frontier) output level. In other words, the loss in net output is noticeable in 
the oil industry. In addition, there is high variation across the firms. When half-normal 
distribution was considered, the whole sample mean of technical efficiency was 0. 75 
and the range was 0.37-0.92. This reveals similar implications of the exponential 
distribution results. 
When the sample was segmented into public and private firms, with 
exponential specification, the average level of technical efficiency for public and 
private firms was 0. 72 and 0.84, respectively. This reveals that, on average, private 
firms are higher by 17% than public firms in the oil industry in terms of technical 
efficiency. Based on half-normal specificat ion, the average level of technical 
efficiency for the two groups was on the order of 0.63 and 0.83, respectively. The 
implication of these figures is private firms are 32% higher than their public 
counterparts in the international oil industry in terms of technical efficiency. 
Figures 8 and 9 portray the technical efficiency distribution for the whole 
sample based on exponential and half-normal specifications, respectively. The 
distribution technical efficiency ratings for public firms using both specifications are 
depicted in figures I 0 and II. The distributions of technical efficiency ratings for the 
private firms are presented in figures 12 and 13 . Apparently, private companies 
outperform their public counterparts in the oil industry in terms of technical efficiency. 
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These results lead to rejection of the null hypothesis that private and public petroleum 
companies are equally technically efficient. 
Therefore, privatization results in improving the performance of the 
transformed public enterprises in terms of technical efficiency. This means the 
privatizing economy can enjoy more output without wasting more inputs or achieving 
the same level of output with lower levels of inputs. Furthermore, the implementation 
of this revolutionary policy in the international oil industry not only benefits the 
privatizing country, but also the whole world, through reducing the waste of this 
precious and non reproducible input. If national security is the argument against the 
privatization of the oil sector, the privatizing country can use the golden share policy, 
which was introduced by the United Kingdom, the pioneering country in privatization. 
9. Conclusions 
In this essay we used the method of maximum likelihood technique to estimate 
the stochastic frontier production function using data on 44 private and public 
companies in the international oil industry. Various specifications for the distribution 
of the one-sided error term, which captures the effect of inefficiency, have been 
employed. In measurement of technical efficiency, private firms outperformed the 
public ones in the international petroleum industry. These results come along with 
many received empirical estimations that indicated the private enterprises are more 
technically efficient than their private counterparts. Therefore, the privatization in the 
oil industry can reduce the excessive usage and waste of resources in the oil sector in 
particular and the whole economy in general. To control the alleged risk on the 
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national interest as a result of oil privatization, the golden share policy can be adopted 
as England did in the beginning of its exemplary privatization in the oil industry. 
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Table 3. Public and e.rivate e.etroleum come.anies 
Government Ownership 
Com~an:t Home Count~ (%) 
1) British Petroleum U.K 35 
2) Chinese Petroleum Taiwan 100 
3) Elf-Aquitaine France 70 
4) Empresa Colombiana de Petroleos Colombia 100 
5) Empresa Nacional de Petroeos Chile 100 
6) Ente Nazionale ldrocarburi Italy 100 
7) Espanola de Petrol Spain 100 
8) Francaise de Petroles France 40 
9) Indian Oil India 100 
10) Neste Finland 100 
11) OMVAG Austria 100 
12) Petroleos Mexicanos Mexico 100 
13) Pertoleos Portugal Portugal 100 
14) Petrubras Brazil 100 
15) Philippine National Philippines 100 
16) Stateoil Norway 100 
17) Yacimientos Petroliferos Argentina 100 
18) Amerada Hess USA 0 
19) Anomina Italy 0 
20) Ashland Oil USA 0 
21) Atlantic Richfield USA 0 
22) Cnies Service USA 0 
23) Coastal Corporation USA 0 
24) CONOCO USA 0 
25) Crown Central Petroleum Corporation USA 0 
26) Daikyo Japan 0 
27) Dorchester USA 0 
28) Exxon USA 0 
29) lndemistu Kosan Japan 0 
30) Korea Oil Korea 0 
31) Marathon USA 0 
32) Mitsubishi Oil Japan 0 
33) Mobil USA 0 
34) National Cooperative Refinery Association USA 0 
35) Pacific Resources USA 0 
36) Petrofina Belgium 0 
37) Phillips USA 0 
38) Royal Dutch/Shell Netherland/U.K 0 
39) Standard Oil of California USA 0 
40) Standard Oil of Indiana USA 0 
41) Texaco USA 0 
42) Tosco Corporation USA 0 
4 3) Uttramar U.K 0 
44) Union Oil USA 0 
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Table 4. Summar}!_ statistics o[_the petroleum companies 
Standard 
Variable Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Total Sale 17,176,000 23,393,000 712,000 I 08,000,000 
($000) 
Capital 12,409,000 16,475,000 235,800 65,260,000 
($000) 
Labor 41,864 57,397 500 206,400 
Table 5. /'roductionf!mction estimation 
Variable Truncated Normal Half-Normal Exponential 
Constant 5.3846 5.3846 5.1740 
(3371) (3 .371) (4 003) 
LnK 0.7577 0.7577 0.7643 
(7.269) (7.269) (8.009) 
LnL 0.0834 0.0834 0.0820 
(0.825) (0.825) (0.873) 
11/cr. 0.4124 0.4124 
(0.058) (0.058) 
cruf crv 2.1853 2.1853 
(0.831) (0 83 I) 
( cru2+ crv2)1 '2 0.5432 0.5432 
(0.677) (0.677) 
crv 0.2496 
(3.483) 
a 4.1078 
(2. I 75) 
Log-Likelihood -14.6786 -14.6786 -14.6943 
cr/ 0.051 I 0.051 I 0.0623 
cru
2 0.2440 0.2440 0.0593 
*Numbers in parentheses are asymptotic !-ratios 
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Table 6. Technical e[jicienc:t:_ scores (halfnormal modeld 
Company Efficiency Score Rank 
1) British Petroleum 0.766976 25 
2) Chinese Petroleum 0.747815 30 
3) Elf-Aquttaine 0.642364 36 
4) Empresa Colombiana de Petroleos 0.599416 39 
5) Empresa Nacional de Petroleos 0.484131 43 
6) Ente Nazionale ldrocarburi 0.779346 22 
7) Espanola de Petrol 0.869880 8 
8) Francaise de Petroleos 0.836106 13 
9) Indian Oil 0.827207 15 
10) Neste 0.740892 31 
11) OM VAG 0.776779 24 
12) Petroleos Mexicanos 0.367402 44 
13) Petroleos Portugal 0.526871 40 
14) Petru bras 0.761854 27 
15) Philippine National 0.652137 35 
16) Stateoil 0.503234 41 
17) Yacimientos Petroliferas 0.491792 42 
18) Amerada Hess 0.788755 19 
19) Anomina 0.920996 1 
20) Ashland Oil 0.851122 10 
21) Atlantic Richfield . 0.813914 17 
22) Cities Service 0.754123 29 
23) Coastal Corporation 0.814566 16 
24) CONOCO 0.625190 38 
25) Crown Central Petroleum Corporation 0.839625 11 
26) Daikyo 0.854106 9 
27) Dorchester 0.636100 37 
28) Exxon 0.899065 3 
29) lndemistu Kosan 0.781531 20 
30) Korea Oil 0.893508 6 
31) Marathon 0.778489 23 
32) Mitsubishi Oil 0.734328 32 
33) Mobil 0.886832 7 
34) National Cooperative Refinery Associati 0.707371 34 
35) Pacific Resources 0.830523 14 
36) Petrofina 0.756691 28 
37) Phillips 0.781453 21 
38) Royal Dutch/Shell 0.839541 12 
39) Standard Oil of California 0.894044 5 
40) Standard Oil of Indiana 0.798516 18 
41) Texaco 0.909919 2 
42) Tosco Corporation 0.895745 4 
43) Ultramar 0.710988 33 
44) Union Oil 0.762159 26 
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Table 7. Tedhnical e!JicieiiCJ'.. scores (!mncated-normal mode/2 
Company Efficiency Score Rank 
1) British Petroleum 0.766976 25 
2) Chinese Petroleum 0.747815 30 
3) Elf-Aquttaine 0.642364 36 
4) Empresa Colombiana de Petroleos 0.599416 39 
5) Empresa Nacional de Petroleos 0.484131 43 
6) Ente Nazionale ldrocarburi 0.779346 22 
7) Espanola de Petrol 0.869880 8 
8) Francaise de Petroleos 0.836106 13 
9) Indian Oil 0.827207 15 
10) Neste 0.740892 31 
11) OMVAG 0.776779 24 
12) Petroleos Mexicanos 0.367402 44 
13) Petroleos Portugal 0.526871 40 
14) Petru bras 0.761854 27 
15) Philippine National 0.652137 35 
16) Stateoil 0.503234 41 
17) Yacimientos Petroliferas 0.491792 42 
18) Amerada Hess 0.788755 19 
19) Anomina 0.920996 1 
20) Ashland Oil 0.851122 10 
21) Atlantic Richfield 0.813914 17 
22) Cities Service 0.754123 29 
23) Coastal Corporation 0.814566 16 
24) CONOCO 0.625190 38 
25) Crown Central Petroleum Corporation 0.839625 11 
26) Daikyo 0.854106 9 
27) Dorchester 0.636100 37 
28) Exxon 0.899065 3 
29) lndemistu Kosan 0.781531 20 
30) Korea Oil 0.893508 6 
31) Marathon 0.778489 23 
32) Mttsubishi Oil 0.734328 32 
33) Mobil 0.886832 7 
34) National Cooperative Refinery Association 0.707371 34 
35) Pacific Resources 0.830523 14 
36) Petrofina 0.756691 28 
37) Phillips 0.781453 21 
38) Royal Dutch/Shell 0.839541 12 
39) Standard Oil of California 0.894044 5 
40) Standard Oil of Indiana 0.798516 18 
41) Texaco 0.909919 2 
42) Tosco Corporation 0.895745 4 
43) Ultramar 0.710988 33 
44) Union Oil 0.762159 26 
100 
Table 8. Technical e[ficieiiCJ!. scores (_exponellfialmode/2 
Company Efficiency Score Rank 
1) British Petroleum 0.814566 25 
2) Chinese Petroleum 0.804367 30 
3) Elf-Aqu~aine 0.707937 37 
4) Empresa Colombiana de Petroleos 0.671528 39 
5) Empresa Nacional de Petroleos 0.532432 43 
6) Ente Nazionale ldrocarburi 0.825389 24 
7) Espanola de Petrol 0.891990 8 
8) Francaise de Petroleos 0.866667 13 
9) Indian Oil 0.862345 15 
10) Neste 0.799315 31 
11) OM VAG 0.826711 22 
12) Petroleos Mexicanos 0.376476 44 
13) Petroleos Portugal 0.584850 40 
14) Petru bras 0.812776 27 
15) Philippine National 0.723033 35 
16) State oil 0.554549 41 
17) Yacimientos Petroliferas 0.539561 42 
18) Amerada Hess 0.833601 19 
19) Anomina 0.928672 1 
20) Ashland Oil 0.878535 10 
21) Atlantic Richfield 0.850526 17 
22) Cities Service 0.808156 29 
23) Coastal Corporation 0.853167 16 
24) CONOCO 0.691011 38 
25) Crown Central Petroleum Corporation 0.872319 11 
26) Daikyo 0.880381 9 
27) Dorchester 0.711628 36 
28) Exxon 0.910101 3 
29) lndemistu Kosan 0.827621 21 
30) Korea Oil 0.908192 5 
31) Marathon 0.826380 23 
32) Mitsubishi Oil 0.792550 32 
33) Mobil 0.901676 7 
34) National Cooperative Refinery Association 0.775382 34 
35) Pacific Resources 0.866321 14 
36) Petrofina 0.810017 28 
37) Phillips 0.827704 20 
38) Royal Dutch/Shell 0.867448 12 
39) Standard Oil of California 0.906921 6 
40) Standard Oil of Indiana 0.839205 18 
41) Texaco 0.918512 2 
42) Tosco Corporation 0.910010 4 
43) Ultra mar 0.775847 33 
44) Union Oil 0.813833 26 
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Table 9. Distribution of technical efficiency in the petroleum firms 
Technical Whole Sample Public Firms Private Firms 
Efficiency Exp 1. HN2 Exp1. HN2 Ex{ HN2 
0.3:ST<0.4 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.00 
0.4:ST<0.5 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.12 0.00 0 00 
0.5:ST<0.6 0.09 0.07 0.23 0.18 0.00 0.00 
0.6:ST<0.7 0.05 0.09 0.06 0.12 0.04 0.07 
0.7:ST<0.8 0.16 0.39 0.18 0.35 0.15 0.41 
0.8:ST<0.9 0.52 0.34 0.47 0.17 0.55 0.44 
0.9:ST<l .O 0.16 0.04 000 0.00 0.26 0.08 
Mean 0.759 0.753 0.717 0.628 0.844 0.832 
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Fig. 8. Technical efficiency rating for the whole sample (exponential) 
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Fig. 9. Technical efficiency rating for the whole sample (half-normal) 
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Fig. I 0. Technical efficiency rating for public firms (half-normal) 
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Fig. II. Technical efficiency rating for public firms (exponential) 
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Fig. 12. Technical efficiency ratingforprivatejirms (exponential) 
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Fig. 13. Technical efficiency rating for private firms (half-normal) 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Privatization has been one of the most widespread revolutionary economic 
policies in the developed and developing countries in the last three decades. In this 
two-essay dissertation, we examined the effects of this policy from microeconomic as 
well as macroeconomic perspectives. 
In the first essay, we employed a panel data approach to investigate the 
relationship between government size and economic performance in terms of 
economic growth. Different specification tests have been conducted to choose the 
most appropriate model for our empirical investigation. The fixed effect model proved 
to be the most plausible one. The results of this model lend support to the argument 
that the larger the government size, the worse the economic performance. We also 
found the empirical evidence in some privatizing countries indicates the positive role 
that privatization can play in mitigating the macroeconomic imbalances plaguing the 
developing countries since the early 1980s. As a result, privatization improved the 
level of economic performance and enabled the privatizing countries to achieve 
positive and noticeable rates of economic growth. Therefore, privatization should be in 
the core of any structural adjustment program aims to resurrect the economy from 
various harsh macroeconomic imbalances. 
In the second essay, we used the method of maximum likelihood technique to 
estimate the stochastic frontier production function using data on 44 private and public 
companies in the international oil industry. Various specifications for the distribution 
of the one-sided error term, which captures the effect of inefficiency, have been 
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employed. In measurement of technical efficiency, private firms outperformed the 
public ones in the international petroleum industry. These results come along with 
many received empirical estimations, which indicated the private enterprises are more 
technically efficient than their private counterparts. Therefore, the privatization in the 
oil industry can reduce the excessive usage and waste of resources in the oil sector in 
particular and the whole economy in general. To control the alleged risk on the 
national interest as a result of oil privatization. the golden share policy can be adopted 
as England did in the beginning of its exemplary privatization in the oil industry. 
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